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EDITORIAL

THINGS NEW AND OLD

The review which we publish this month of the second volume of Dr. Foakes Jackson's and Dr. Kirsopp Lake's *Prolegomena to Acts* will be read, we think, with exceptional interest by all who believe that the time is not far distant when Anglican theology in this country will be able to rid itself of the discomfort which the Higher Criticism has from time to time occasioned it. Hitherto the tendency has been strong to meet Criticism on its own grounds; and though a conservative attitude has again and again proved itself amply justified even in this field, taken alone, and has been maintained by a succession of powerful scholars from Lightfoot's time to our own, yet an uneasy sense has persisted that, after all, a decision had not yet been reached. Mr. Hoskyns's review marks a refusal to continue this indecisive battle on the old ground; and, like a good general, he definitely moves his forces to a new one, where the chances of decision and advance are more encouraging.

This review should be read in conjunction with Mr. Will Spens's review of Dr. Gore's *Belief in God*, published in our April issue; with the articles on Authority and on the Psychology of Conversion, which have appeared in our columns from the pen of Mr. Thouless during the last eighteen months; and (we may add) with an able and instructive article by Mr. Wilfred Knox on Anglo-Catholics and Reunion, published in the *Constructive Quarterly* for last March. Together they indicate that the redirection of theological thought so characteristic of what is sometimes called "the younger Cambridge school" has already gone a considerable distance, far enough to uncover new objectives and to offer solid promise of further success. Perhaps we shall best sum up what is involved if we say that

the interest is shifted from documents to life, from history as the record of external events to history regarded as the creation of a religious movement, and that the issue contended for is the nature, significance, and dominant value of the supernatural revealed in experience. In this redirection the leaders are not without allies in various quarters.

Maurice, the most prophetic figure in Victorian theology, pointed to some such strategical change, when the work of Strauss and his disciples was first becoming known in England seventy years ago. Alluding to the critical theory of Christ "as a shadow-personage, whom the imagination has clothed, as it does all its heroes, with a certain divinity, really belonging to, and derived from, itself"—a phrase which describes not only the views of many Biblical critics, but those also of many modern students of Psychology and Comparative Religion—Maurice notes the amazement and alarm which this theory causes, and proceeds:

> The next step is to look about for some method of confuting the theory; to see whether we can prove that Strauss and his disciples have misquoted the New Testament or abused ancient authorities. Perhaps, if we cannot establish these points sufficiently by our learning, our German friends, who have been more closely engaged in the battle, may help us. I dare say they can, and that we also may do something for ourselves in that line, if we try. But I am convinced, also, that the effort will be worth next to nothing, if it is made ever so skilfully, if our blows are ever so straight and well directed. That which is a tendency and habit of the heart is not cured by detecting fallacies in the mode in which it is embodied and presented to the intellect. If you have no other way of showing Christ not to be a mystical being, or a man elevated into a God by the same process which has deified thousands before and since, except by convicting the propounder of the hypothesis of some philological and historical blunders, you may be quite sure that he will prevail, though those blunders were multiplied a thousand-fold.—(*Theological Essays*, pp. 66, 67. 1853.)

Yet another ally is to be found in Professor Kirsopp Lake himself. The *Harvard Theological Review* for January, 1922, contains a masterly article from his pen entitled "The Problem of Christian Origins." After summarizing the main drift of critical theology in modern times—in the course of which he alludes to Canon Streeter's recent theory of the composition of St. Luke's Gospel as seeming to him "to be as convincing as any hypothesis of the kind can be"—he presents this dilemma:

> If Jesus be a teacher and not divine, and there is much to be said for this view, theologians must have the courage of their opinions, place Jesus in the line of teachers and prophets which will never end while

the world lasts, and take His teachings as a landmark in history, not as its goal. This position, whether right or wrong, is at least not unreasonable. It is the alternative to traditional orthodox Christianity.

Finally, though it is possible that Dr. Lake inclines to this view himself, he confesses that, even if true, it leaves the problem of the origin of Christianity unsolved.

> Nevertheless, the Church never has been merely an institution for propagating this or any other form of teaching. It has been a great instrument for the purification of men's minds and souls. It has been, such at least must be the verdict of history, neither infallible nor indefectible in endeavouring to fulfil this mission, but there has never been any institution which has met with so much success. . . . It was the sacramental system, the mysteries, which in the main gave men what they needed, purification and strength that they might follow the moral vision which they had seen. Lutheran, and even Calvinistic, Christianity changed the theory, but not the practice. It still remains true that the orthodox Churches are shown by experience to give purification, though reason may show that they do not give intellectual truth. To explain why this is so is the great problem before the theologians and psychologists of the future.

Save that the last sentence appears to involve a pre-judging of the issue, we do not know that the problem could be more clearly stated.

A timely comment on what Dr. Lake has to say about the Church is provided by his colleague, Dr. Foakes Jackson, in *An Introduction to the History of Christianity*, A.D. 590–1314 (Macmillan, 1921, 20s. net), which presents a vivid bird's-eye view of those troubled centuries of her story. The book is brilliantly written, and abounds in shrewd judgments and vivid sketches of character, both individual and social. Thus, of Pope John XII. and his age, he writes:

> The Pope was denounced by the clergy to the Emperor. He was accused of turning his palace into a brothel, of ordaining a deacon in a stable, of saying Mass without himself communicating, of simony, of consecrating a boy of ten a bishop, of wearing armour, of hunting publicly, of calling on the demons Venus and Mercury when playing dice, of not saying Mass or the canonical hours, of not using the sign of the cross in blessing himself, and of arson. The strange mixture of gross sins and trivial offences is characteristic of the age.

Between this and modern Roman Catholicism it might seem difficult to see a continuity: the change from laxity to rigorism could hardly be more pronounced. Yet the underlying aims and theories of the Papacy have not changed.

> From the middle of the eighth century to the present time the object of the Roman Church has been to secure independence of any secular control in Italy, and to be supported by some strong power outside the limit of the peninsula.

The book is unfortunately marred in production by a number of serious misprints.

In *A Short History of our Religion* (G. Bell and Sons, 1922, 6s. net), Mr. D. C. Somervell, who is a Tonbridge master, has performed that rare service of writing the book which everyone wanted. We do not hesitate to describe the book as in its way a masterpiece, and we hope that it will find its way extensively into the hands of schoolmasters, parents, and senior Public School boys. Every page is terse, to the point, full of apt and witty illustration. Thus, commenting on the summary condemnations which the editor of the Books of Kings passes on nearly every reign, he says:

> Such censure fell unfairly on good and bad alike. It is as if a Puritan historian, editing a history of England, were to have written as a footnote to every reign previous to Henry VIII.: "He did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord," on the ground that adoration of the Virgin Mary and invocation of the Saints under Roman Catholic rites prevailed during the reign.

Mr. Somervell has some fine things to say about the prophets, whose achievement he regards as "perhaps the most astonishing in the history of the human mind." And he is excellent in dealing with the significance of Biblical criticism.

> Even where modern criticism has thrown doubt on the course of events, as in the case of the origin of the kingship . . . though much supposed history is swept away, not a shadow of doubt is thereby thrown on the fact of God's revelation. We must learn, however, to see that revelation in a new light. . . . On the whole, when so seen, the story becomes much more inspiring, because much more progressive. . . . The history of religion becomes, like the history of science, a tale of pioneering and discovery.

And again:

> The Church has cherished the Fourth Gospel because it most emphatically expressed the general conviction of the Church, that Christ was both Man and God. . . . If we refuse to believe that the Apostles were, after Christ's Crucifixion, guided by the Holy Spirit, then no doubt the Christ of St. John is a product of human delusion. If, however, we believe that they were so guided, then the Christ of St. John is as truly the revelation of Christ in the year 100 as the Christ of St. Mark is the revelation of Christ in the year 30, as preserved by human memory and recorded forty years later.

In treating of the Middle Ages, Mr. Somervell confines himself to Western Europe, letting the history of the Eastern Church drop out of sight; and by a similar concentration he limits the last part of his book—about a third of the whole—to

"the study of the non-Roman Churches in England and Scotland during the last three and a half centuries." This procedure, open to criticism as he admits it to be, is justified, we think, by the immediate practical aim of the book, which is, if we mistake not, to provide a convenient textbook for use in the higher forms of Public Schools. The chapter on the Victorian Age is full of crisp summaries. Newman's great work was not only that he "set going a great revival in the Church of England, but taught Englishmen of all creeds to form a juster and more kindly opinion of the Church of Rome." "One of the results of the Oxford movement was the appearance of a new type of bishop, the type which is almost universal to-day. . . . In converting the Episcopate the Oxford movement succeeded where the Evangelical movement had failed." Tait he describes as "probably the greatest Archbishop of Canterbury since the Middle Ages." Again, "the external history of Nonconformity during the Victorian Age is an important chapter in the history of the growth of toleration." And of the ritualistic controversy, though it "brought many to take a keen interest in the history, traditions, and practices of the Church," he says in very just criticism that "it showed the lamentable inability of the Church to speak with a living voice on a disputed point." Finally, after speaking of the Enabling Act and of the Lambeth Conference of 1920, he closes the story on this hopeful note: "To-day, the Church of England, though reduced in numbers (like Gideon's army), is probably more alive than it ever was before, more earnest, more humble, more intelligent, and the spirit of intolerance and persecution, though not dead, is dying."

We have written at such length of Mr. Somervell's book because we regard it as a real contribution to one part of a very pressing problem—the problem of religion and of vocation at our great Public Schools. That problem is many-sided, and many of its aspects, such as Worship and Preparation for Confirmation, are outside the scope of this volume. But Mr. Somervell has shown how religious teaching may be given in Form, and by laymen, in a way that presents the history of the Christian Church as an organic process, full of interest and inspiration, and calling to-day for the ablest as well as the most devoted of her sons to come and work in the vineyard of God.

The mention of this topic suggests allusion to two other books which have a cognate interest. Mr. Shane Leslie's *The Oppidan* presents a very striking photograph of Eton at

the turn of the century. Its author has been severely, and we think unjustly, taken to task for "speaking evil of dignities." We do not believe that that is either the intention or the effect of the story. Those who knew Dr. Warre, and who regarded him with warm affection, will be able—and will desire—to correct and still more to supplement the impression which Mr. Leslie presents of him. But that picture shows us, even as it stands, many of those elements in the Headmaster's character—his simplicity, his reserve, his justice and kindliness—which invested him in the eyes of the school with a certain awe and veneration. It was noted at Uppingham that, on the Sunday when Edward Thring died, the Psalm sung in Chapel was the seventy-eighth, and the closing verse was recognized as an inspired epitaph on his work. "So he fed them with a faithful and true heart; and ruled them prudently with all his power." Those who were at Eton in the closing years of Dr. Warre's Headmastership would assuredly have applied the same words to him.

At the same time a large part of the school-boy's life is not consciously in contact with the governing authority; and it is this—its interests, enterprises, ambitions, spiritual rises and falls, virtues, rascalities, inscrutable impulses—which is so graphically portrayed in *The Oppidan*. As a sociological study of Eton of twenty years ago, the book is one of unusual interest.

Meanwhile "the old order changeth, yielding place to new." Even in those days there was no more stimulating voice heard in the pulpit of Upper Chapel than that of the present Headmaster. When Dr. Warre preached, it was like Moses addressing the children of Israel, or Nehemiah calling a solemn assembly of the returned exiles. We in the pews were part of a historic community rather than individuals. But when Dr. Alington preached the individual found himself being spoken to, and his own struggles, doubts, intuitions being met. And the little collection of *Eton Fables* (Longmans, 1921, 3s. 6d. net), recently published, shows that their author has not forgotten his craft. That entitled "The Moving Staircase" must rank with anything that R. L. Stevenson wrote in similar vein.

"Surely it's as plain as a pikestaff that a moving staircase represents just the help a true religion gives you: once lay hold on the truth and there you are! Of course, you can go farther if you like, and provided other people, like that ritualistic woman, don't get in your way; but hold on to the truth, and you're bound to arrive in time. But she's breaking all the rules: it says clearly, 'Don't sit on the steps in case others want to pass, and don't put parcels on them either!'"

So much for true religion. The descending staircase is false religion:

"The people on that are the poor brutes with a false religion—Mohammedans, infidels, heretics, and all that lot. Mind you, I don't say none of them are good men, but I do say it's in spite of their religion and not because of it."

But even the middle stationary staircase has its lesson too:

"There's your free-thinker for you! No religion for him! He won't even try and see if there's anything in it. . . . I don't deny he'll get there in the end, but it's a slow business, and think of all the labour he'll waste. Why can't he take God at His word instead of insisting on going his own way?" . . .

He moved towards the staircase, but just as he was going a question came into my head—he was already some little way up.

"What about stepping off with the right foot first?" I called after him.

"Oh, that's all right," he shouted cheerily down. "A happy death-bed, my boy, that's what it is!"

We hear a good deal nowadays about religion at the Public Schools, and are perhaps apt to forget how much of it there is. We believe we are right in saying that not one of the great Public Schools is directly represented in the National Assembly. That is a serious loss and should be rectified; and perhaps the proceedings in the Upper House of Convocation might be considerably enlivened if it were to come to include the author of *Eton Fables*.

AUTHORITY IN MORALS: ITS GROUNDS IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE

In the treatment of the grounds in human experience of religion two problems were distinguished, the one psychological and the other philosophical. The same two problems arise in connection with morality, although their relative importance for authority in morals is strikingly different. There is also, as in the case of religion, the general problem of the value for authority in morals of a ground in human experience. A great part of the discussion of these questions would be merely recapitulation of what has already been said in connection with religion. Where this is the case, I shall refer back to earlier articles in order to avoid unnecessary repetition.

The two problems referred to are: First, the psychological problem of how far the roots of our moral ideas can be found in experience; secondly, how far this grounding of moral ideas in human experience is a testimony to their objective validity. The second of these problems is strictly analogous to the question of how far human experience provides testimony to the truth of religious doctrines. I have said that it is a less important problem for moral authority than is the corresponding religious problem for authority in religion. This is because morality is possible without a belief in the objectivity of moral values. We may obey the moral law without supposing that it has any higher warrant than the fact that it is a convenient method of securing the greatest good of the greatest number. A large number of highly moral, uneducated people exist who have never heard of the problem of the objectivity of moral values, and who, if it were explained to them, would not see that it had any bearing on their conduct. This is not the case with the truth of religious doctrines. The most ignorant devotee realizes that his worship would be impossible if there were no Divine Being by whom his prayers were heard. Also it cannot be denied that believers in the most thorough theory of the relativity of morals are no worse livers than their neighbours. It may be argued that they are guilty of an inconsistency in claiming (as Westermarck does) that their theory leads to a higher standard of morality than their opponents', on the ground that there is no meaning to be attached to "higher" or "lower" moral standards unless there is a universally valid criterion by which to judge.

It may also be argued that if this theory were widely under-

stood, and not merely believed by persons whose academic gravity protected them from temptation to flagrantly immoral behaviour, then it would lead to a general lowering of the standard of morality. If people believed that their conduct need be determined by no more ultimate principle than that it seemed right to them, then it is possible that those whose moral intuitions are not very fine and can easily be concealed by the promptings of self-interest would be less swayed by moral considerations than they are now. We here have a reason why authority in morals must to some extent feel itself concerned with what otherwise seems a purely academic question, but it is easy to see that its concern with the question of the objectivity of moral judgments is less fundamental than the concern of authority in religion with the question of the truth of its doctrines. Since this question has already been discussed in connection with the moral argument for the existence of God, I will not again discuss it at length.

The moral ideas of mankind find expression in two kinds of authority. First, in social disapproval, which, though not codified, is a very powerful deterrent of antisocial and immoral action. This may be called "unorganized moral authority." Secondly, by codes of laws, which may be called "organized moral authority." The problem of this essay is to trace the grounds in human experience of these two kinds of authority.

It is necessary here to point out that this is only a part of the problem of the basis of moral ideas. It leaves on one side the question of how far morality has any other basis, in reason or in revelation. I shall therefore be discussing the problems of morality very largely from the point of view of those ethical writers who base their ethical systems entirely on human experience, such as Hume and Westermarck. I do not wish to be understood to be implying an acceptance of their dogma that moral ideas have no other basis. It is possible that the empirical treatment of morality suffers from a necessary incompleteness because moral ideas are founded ultimately on a basis which is not empirical. This need not, however, prevent us from discussing their grounds in human experience as a separate problem. It warns us of the danger of supposing that when we have done this we have said all that is to be said about the foundations of morality.

The term "experience" may, as before, conveniently be extended to include the biological and psychological facts which are related to the origin and development of moral ideas, as well as the conscious roots of moral actions, since the former are experienced by us as scientific investigators. We may,

therefore, consider the experience relevant to authority in morals under these two headings. The first of these may be called "morality in biology"; the second, "the moral consciousness."

Morality in Biology

From the point of view of evolutionary biology, a large part of morality is determined by the conflict amongst gregarious animals between the interests of the individual and the herd. The moral emotions are the affective roots of the modes of conduct by which the herd is protected from the disruptive influence of antisocial conduct on the part of its members.

It was at one time supposed that morality could be in no sense a product of the evolutionary process, since that part of moral action which was concerned with the individual's duty towards his neighbour could have no survival value for him, and might, indeed, be harmful to him. This, however, assumes that the unit in the struggle for existence is always the individual. This is not the case amongst gregarious animals, with whom the unit in the struggle for existence is the herd. In order to secure the continuance of a race of gregarious animals, it is necessary that the herd should survive, however many individuals in it may be destroyed. That herd will have the best chance of surviving in which the members most completely subordinate their own interests to the interests of the herd as a whole. The instinctive tendency, therefore, for the individual to sacrifice himself for the herd will tend to be increased in the struggle for existence by the survival of those herds in which it is strongly developed, and the elimination of those in which it is weaker. The development of altruistic impulses in man is not, therefore, inconsistent with the course of evolution, but is accounted for, on the evolutionary theory, by the fact that he is a gregarious animal descended from a long line of gregarious ancestors.

This is all that biologists generally tell us about the instinctive sources of morality, but it does not seem very complete. Not all morality is concerned with the conflict between a man's regard for himself and for his neighbour. A fuller discussion of the relation between instinct and morality must be preceded by a more detailed account of instinct.

Dr. McDougall describes instincts as "innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of species to their environment and that can be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of

which they are innate elements nor acquired by individuals in the course of their lifetime.* Examples of such tendencies can be found in the instinct which drives a hen to sit on a nest of eggs, the bee to collect honey, and the human mother to expend all her energy in care for her child. It was customary at one time to speak as if instinct were something confined to what were called the lower animals, and replaced in man by the higher faculty of reason. Since that time biology and social psychology have shown the close relationship between man and the other animals, and the pervasion of man's life by his instincts has been increasingly recognized. This seems to be sufficient reason for starting a discussion of human conduct by the consideration of instinct.

The instincts which influence human conduct may be divided into three classes: those connected with the preservation of the individual, of the race, and of the herd (or group), respectively.

The instincts which have for their object the preservation of the individual are those generally grouped under the name of instincts of self-preservation. Such are the instincts of flight and of aggression, which determine his conduct in danger, and the instinct of nutrition. The individual deficient in these instincts would, in a wild state, be quickly eliminated by falling a prey to some other animal or by starving to death.

There are, however, two very strong instincts, the sex instinct and the maternal instinct, which have no survival value to the individual animal possessing them. Any particular animal deficient in these instincts would be in no way handicapped in the struggle for existence. Its chance of survival would, in fact, be increased, for it would be free from the dangers to which these two instincts frequently expose their possessors. They are, however, of supreme importance for the survival of the race.

Gregarious animals have also a set of instincts which have as their object the preservation of the herd. A herd of animals whose members had only those instincts which are directed towards the preservation of the individual, so that in danger each member was concerned with his own safety and not with that of the herd, would be very helpless compared with one in which each individual was ready to sacrifice himself for the safety of the herd as a whole. In this way the herd instinct is developed, which makes the gregarious animal feel and act for the herd as a whole. This same instinct makes the gregarious animal uneasy except when it is in close fellowship with other individuals, and causes that sensitiveness to the influence of

* *Social Psychology*, p. 23.

herd suggestion on which the safety and well-being of the group very largely depend.

The altruistic emotions which spring from the herd instinct and from the sex and maternal instincts will be discussed in the next section. It will also be necessary there to discuss herd suggestion and its connection with unorganized moral authority. The problem to be discussed here is how far moral ideas can be regarded as due to the interplay of these three groups of instincts.

Although the greater part of morality is concerned with the conflict between the herd instinct and the instinct of self-preservation, it is clear that even on the biological level this is not an adequate account of all moral ideas. Moral value is attached to conduct in harmony with each of these three kinds of instinct, when it does not come into conflict with the requirements of other instincts whose claims ought to be preferred. It is recognized to be the duty of a man to take care of himself, when this care does not conflict with his duty to other people. In this case obedience to the instinct of self-preservation is recognized to have moral value. It can even be argued that a great good of one's self should be preferred to a small good of other people. In this case the promptings of the instinct of self-preservation are given greater moral value than the opposing demands of the herd instinct. The progress from lower to higher moral levels is often from loyalty to smaller to loyalty to larger groups. Here we have moral significance attached to a conflict within the system of the herd instinct itself.

There is a further attempted simplification of the problem of the relationship between instinct and morality which must be noticed here because of its practical importance for authority in morals. A great deal of traditional moral theory seems to assume that the moral conflict is between the instincts which we have inherited from our animal ancestors and what has been called our higher natures. This idea seems to be wrong in theory and disastrous in practice. In the moral conflict in the mind of the individual there are instinctive impulses fighting on the side of the good. Even in the case of sexual indulgence, which seems the clearest case of a simple instinct overcoming something higher in the mind of the person concerned, this is not, in fact, a complete explanation of what is happening. In immoral sexual indulgence there is violation of the sex instinct. The sex instinct is not merely sexual desire. It is a complex constellation of instinctive tendencies which include the impulse to seek union with a single love-object for whom love is felt, to protect that object, to provide for offspring, and so on.

In promiscuous sexual gratification, one part only of the sex instinct is satisfied—sexual desire—while the impulses of the other parts are violated. Even in this moral conflict in the mind of man, therefore, it is not true to describe it simply as a struggle between his animal nature and something higher. Elements in his sex instinct itself are taking part in the struggle on the side which we recognize as the side of the good. This subject will be returned to later, in the discussion of that tendency in Christian morals to see evil in the instinctive nature itself, and not in an absence of control of the instinctive nature, or the absence of due subordination of one instinct to another.

From the purely biological point of view, the most adequate description of moral conduct appears to be that it is the conduct which best serves the biological end of the continuance of the species. It is for this reason that the impulses of the herd instinct are on the whole considered to be of higher moral value than the impulses of the instinct of self-preservation, while the duty of the mother to her child takes moral precedence of her duty to the group as a whole. The biological purpose is served by the individual following the three sets of instincts: those for the preservation of the race, those for the preservation of the group, and those for the preservation of the individual, in that order. So far as this is not the order of their strength in the impulses of the individual, the moral conflict arises.

This does not claim to be a complete account of morality, but only an account of its grounds in this particular kind of human experience. No account has been taken of the fact that the good may be something *sui generis* and incapable of expression in terms of biological usefulness, because just so far as this is true the question of its grounds in biology will be meaningless. The part played by the religious motive in morality has also necessarily been neglected. This will be discussed later. It is maintained, however, that, so far as it goes, this is an accurate account of the relation between moral conduct and instinct, and that when moral authority makes its appeal to experience, rather than to abstract principles, it is in part to such experience that it must appeal.

The Moral Consciousness

The empirical fact with which any discussion of our problem must start is that we do, in fact, make moral judgments. We condemn certain actions in ourselves and in others as "wrong," and we commend other actions as "right." We feel an emotion of approval when we contemplate those actions we commend

as right, and an emotion of disapproval at those actions we condemn as wrong. If these moral emotions are regarded as the primary thing in ethics, the ethical system of Emotionalism is reached. Westermarck says: "The moral concepts are essentially generalizations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions." It would be a digression from the subject of this article to discuss whether this view is the true one. It will hardly be denied that emotions of approval and disapproval are the psychological sources of many of our moral judgments. It is possible to consider the facts of the moral consciousness simply as facts without discussing their significance for ethical theory. These will be the psychological facts of experience on which authority in morals must be in part grounded.

It must be noticed that the emotions which are called moral emotions—resentment and retributive kinds of emotion at the actions of other persons, and self-reproach and self-approval at our own—are psychologically identical with emotions which have no moral significance. Self-approval may be felt by the man who is lucky at cards, or even by the man who successfully cheats. Self-reproach is felt when we have lost something of value, although we may attach no moral blame to ourselves. Most people feel shame in connection with the act of excretion.

It is, moreover, impossible to treat the conscious accompaniments of moral judgments adequately without some consideration of the psychology of herd suggestion. The power of unorganized moral authority is almost entirely the result of the influence upon us of the opinions and feelings of other people. It is not merely that we are influenced in our conduct by the moral emotions of those surrounding us, but also that they have the power of making us share these emotions. Our own moral emotions are therefore in part rooted in our social relationships. Since herd suggestion is derived from the group, it not unnaturally tends on the whole to strengthen those instinctive tendencies whose object is the preservation of the group. Its weight is felt most strongly against courses of action which threaten the well-being of the community to which the individual belongs.

The disinterested emotions are also psychological facts of importance in the discussion of morality. The reason for their importance is that they are the affective roots of conduct which has as its end the preservation of the group or of the individual's offspring. When there is a conflict between the instinct of self-preservation and the herd instinct, this will appear to consciousness as a conflict between an emotion which has the

self as its object and the corresponding disinterested emotion (between, let us say, fear and disinterested fear).

The disinterested emotions are emotions felt by one individual in response to situations which affect others. Thus disinterested fear is felt by a mother when her young are in danger, and this emotion may lead her to expose herself to danger in order to protect them. Disinterested anger is felt by the other members of a herd when one of the herd is injured. These disinterested emotions are not confined to man, but have been observed even among the lower animals. Hudson describes the conduct of a field-mouse divided between fear for herself and disinterested fear on behalf of her young. When he approached, she abandoned them, but waited at a certain distance. On his remaining motionless she returned with hesitation, "frequently pausing to start and tremble, and masking her approach with corn-stumps and little inequalities in the surface of the ground,"* and, carrying them off one by one, concealed them. Cases of disinterested anger in animals are also quoted by Shand. "Brehm relates how his hunting dogs chased a troop of baboons: one young one was cut off and ran up a rock out of reach of the dogs. An old male baboon saw this, and came to the rescue; 'showing his teeth, and backed by the furious barking of the rest of the baboons, he disconcerted and cowed these savage dogs,' and saved the young one."†

These emotions play the same part in determining our conduct in response to the impulses of the herd instinct, and to certain elements of the sex and maternal instinct, as is played by the self-interested emotions in determining conduct which proceeds from the instinct of self-preservation. The conflict between these two types of emotions may be regarded as the conscious concomitant of the conflict between different kinds of instinctive behaviour.

So far moral obligation has been treated without any consideration of the moral duties connected with religion. Even from the empirical point of view, it is not possible to leave religion out of a discussion of morality. It was maintained in the first part of this essay that one of the psychological roots of religious belief is the necessity of the mind to have an additional incentive on the side of ordinary morality. The emotional love for God is required to counterbalance the attraction of sin. The strength of this necessity is very different in

* *The Naturalist in La Plata*, ch. vi., pp. 105, 106, quoted in *The Foundations of Character*, by A. F. Shand, p. 205.

† *The Foundations of Character*, by A. F. Shand, p. 236, quoting from *Illustriertes Thierleben*, I., p. 528.

different persons. Where it is strong, a religion of a peculiarly ethical kind is produced. If this were the only root of religion, religion would be principally a prop for ordinary morality, and would have no peculiar moral obligations of its own. Whether or not this is what religion should be, it is certainly not what it is. Religious obligation has always been something different from ordinary moral obligation, and in many respects opposed to it. Religion has violated the requirements of the instinct of self-preservation by putting a high moral value on fasting and other severities towards the body, of no value to other people or to the race. It has put a similar high moral value on retirement from the world and from the opportunity of doing good to one's fellow-men, and has thus opposed the impulses of the herd instinct; and on chastity, thus thwarting the instincts which have as their end the preservation of the race. Even if it be objected that these are barbarities which modern enlightened religion has given up, it remains true that all religions are necessarily out of harmony in their moral ideas with the evolutionary system of morals already sketched out. There are two distinct breaches between religious morality and evolutionary morality. In the existence among religious persons of a sentiment which has God as its object, an emotional force is introduced which has no interest in the biological end of the continuance of the species. It is, as a matter of fact, frequently opposed to this end. It is sound psychology to assert that a strong religious sentiment weakens the power over the individual of human love, and of the influence of his fellow-men. In addition to this, the belief in a future life introduces a discordant element into this-world morality. In irreligious morality the infliction of unnecessary suffering on one's fellow-men is one of the worst possible offences, but when there is an eternity of possible happiness or misery to be thrown into the balance as well, the sufferings of human beings in time becomes relatively unimportant. From a strictly utilitarian point of view, the practice of burning the bodies of men in order to save souls could be justified when both worlds are taken into account. Temporal human suffering necessarily has less weight in a religious system of morality.

But if to our modern humanitarian sympathies this seems a serious charge against religious morality, there is another side to the question. Religious faith makes possible what are generally felt to be the most precious of virtues, though from the point of view of a purely evolutionary ethic they may appear to be weak or foolish. Belief in God makes possible the sense of weakness and poverty as measured by perfect Spirit, which results in unpretentiousness and littleness in one's own eyes.

Genial, happy heroism in the face of misery, failure, and death is the fruit of a belief in God and in Eternity. So also is a creative love for one's fellow-man, which is given in spite of his actual unlovableness, and is sufficiently strong to make the giver love him into lovableness.* These are virtues continually produced by religious faith which must be weighed in the balance against the failure of religious morality, on the whole, to come up to the standard of non-religious this-world humanitarianism.

In Christianity there is also the acceptance of the Incarnation which must modify the moral outlook of its adherents. The Christian must regard suffering as something less ultimately evil as a result of his belief that it has been shared by God Himself for the purpose of human redemption. Even about sin, he may say with Lady Julian that the tokens of sin shall be turned to worship in a future life—a statement that is immoral as well as foolish to naturalistic morality.

The modifications in moral ideas made by religion are, of course, as genuinely fruits of human experience as are the moral ideas which result from the interplay of the instincts. In order to account for them, it is necessary to consider religious experience as part of the experience on which morality is grounded. The mind to which the love for God is a sentiment comparable in strength with the sentiments based on man's instinctive nature will find the emotions derived from that sentiment playing a part in the determination of his conduct of which his moral theories must take account. It may be, of course, that, even from the point of view of religious authority, moral considerations should weigh on the side of the instinctive nature, that a man's love for his family ought, for example, to outweigh his desire to spend his life in religious contemplation in a monastery.

The Relation of the Facts Considered to Authority in Morals

In morality, as in religion, men cannot be expected to accept a code which has no foundation in their own experience of what is right and wrong. It is true that their acceptance of an authority is partly determined by the fact that their ideas of right and wrong are, under the influence of herd suggestion, very largely produced by the authority itself. This does not, however, altogether prevent the possibility of a conflict between

* This account of distinctively religious virtues is suggested by a paper by Baron F. von Huegel in a symposium on *Religion and Morals*, at the Congress of Philosophy, 1920.

the moral sense of the members of a community and the organized authority under which they find themselves. When this conflict arises men appeal to their own moral feelings as the ultimate ground on which moral authority ought to be based. If they are scientists, they will appeal to the biological facts which are, in their opinion, the ground of morality, while they will discount the element in the popular moral opinions which they know to be due to herd suggestion. If they are philosophers, they will appeal to the ultimate principles in reason on which moral values depend. The first two of these appeals are to human experience, so the basis of them has been discussed in this article. The third is not to experience, but to reason, and is therefore outside our subject. It may, of course, be the most important. It is possible that the value of the appeal to experience can only be decided at the bar of reason.

We can find, in morals as in religion, authority which is weak because it is not founded sufficiently deeply in human experience. A tyrannical moral authority, in which a moral code is enforced on men simply as the will of a person whose prestige is sufficient to enforce submission is not an authority entirely opposed to the experience of its subjects. The submission to the force of prestige has itself an instinctive foundation, since it is a constituent of the herd instinct. But such authority is weaker in its hold on the allegiance of its subjects than one which commands the respect of their own independent moral intuitions.

The moral creed which regards as evil the instinctive nature itself has already been mentioned. This appears in the Protestant tradition as Puritanism, and in Catholicism as Augustinianism and as Jansenism. The fact that the moral struggle frequently appears to consciousness as if it were a struggle against instinct, particularly against the sex instinct, tends to make the mind transfer its antipathy from the abusive indulgence of the instinct to the instinct itself. It is of considerable psychological interest to notice that many of the principal upholders of this moral creed have been men who have made their instinctive natures vile to themselves by an unbridled indulgence which, as has already been pointed out, is itself a violation of instinct. This tradition owes its peculiar weakness to the fact that it is in harmony only with a variety of experience which is not normal, and to the fact that it is biologically unsound. It fails to hold the allegiance of those whose training and lives have not tended to develop in them the morbid horror of instinct on which it rests, and whose knowledge of science predisposes them in favour of a view in which the natural is normally regarded as the good.

I have already pointed out the danger to religious authority of the rigidity of formulæ originally designed to safeguard earlier experiences, preventing them from being fluid to later experience. The same danger is present in moral codes. Human experience progresses from less to more perfect moral ideas, and when men find the realization of this progress obstructed by the rigidity of earlier moral codes, a condition is set up which threatens the stability of the whole of moral authority. For example, that progress in moral ideals which consists in a realization of the individual's duty to wider social groups is obstructed by the whole of the code which commands a selective loyalty to the smaller group. The replacement of the injunction to love the members of the individual's own tribe and to hate those of neighbouring tribes by an injunction to love also members of other tribes is opposed by the whole code of moral injunctions which enshrine tribal sentiment. The prophet who tries to transcend that sentiment is felt to be a danger to tribal authority. This conflict has remained through all time up to the present day. The international movement which would replace national sentiment by a sentiment for the whole of mankind is felt to be a threat to the authority of the national group. A similar conflict is visible at the present time on the question of marriage. There is a widespread feeling that the moral ideals expressed in our marriage customs are out of date and that modern moral ideals have progressed beyond them. These newer moral ideas may be right or wrong. They are challenges to the older formulæ from popular sentiments which have ceased to be in harmony with them. So far as they can be judged by human experience, they must show their conformity to the general purpose of life, and to the moral intuitions of men.

ROBERT H. THOULESS

CREDO IN CARNIS RESURRECTIONEM

SOME weeks ago I wrote in a letter published by *The Times* the following sentences:

"Mr. Major's grievance is that false views are still implied in the Church's formularies. It seems to me that the implications are more often in the reader's mind than in the formulary itself, and in my experience the abandonment of them has sometimes made the formulary more intelligible. A correction of false views about the nature of matter, for example, has removed difficulties; thirty years ago I was inclined to stammer in the phrase 'resurrection of the flesh,' which I can now pronounce without hesitation."

On reading this the Editor of THEOLOGY asked me for an explanation of this deliverance from a difficulty. It is not easy

to answer, for I had in view a mental process of which I had never made any detailed examination. Consciousness of it there has been, and still more of its practical effect, but it is doubtful whether I can recall every stage. Moreover, some reference must be made to a department of natural science, and I am lamentably ill-equipped for this. Many years ago I dropped the express study of it, and my remaining knowledge—if it can be so called—is very old-fashioned. Since then I have but glanced at new developments, interested, and trying to relate them to what I had learnt, but necessarily in a groping fashion. How shall I dare to expose my ignorance by speaking professedly of them? Can the feeble apprehension, which meant so much for me, have any value or interest for others? The Editor shall decide.

I did stammer over the resurrection of the flesh. As soon as I began to think seriously about the words, I found myself in difficulties. I was certainly not peculiar in this. Ever since the Roman Church invented the phrase—I think that was the real origin of it—to meet the dangerous spiritualism of Gnostics, or perhaps of Marcion, it has been a cause of trouble. The objections raised against it have been varied enough, sometimes captious, sometimes gravely argued, sometimes aggressive from without the Church, sometimes defensive from within as setting forth a worthier conception of resurrection. But, though various, they have all proceeded from the same standpoint. This must be determined.

It is the assumption of a clear and immovable distinction between spirit and matter. This distinction, seeming so obvious to common sense, is said by competent scholars to have been outside the range of Hebrew thought, and St. Paul, though he must have been aware of it in its Greek form, gives no indication of it in his writings; πνεῦμα does not for him carry this part of the signification which we assign to it, and he may have conceived it in the sense of that subtle corporeity which we find in St. Augustine's demonology. But in Greek thought the distinction became a commonplace from the time when Plato gave it consistency. Aristotle, indeed, was moved by his feeling for unity to rebel against this dualism; ὑλὴ became for him a purely logical concept, arrived at by the analysis of all existing things into matter and form; formless matter he counted non-existent, and this conviction underlies his criticism of the Platonic ideas. But Aristotle's time was not yet; the Platonic dualism was dominant, and found its way to the Jewry of Alexandria. The teaching of the Book of Wisdom that "the corruptible body presses down the soul" was destined to harass St. Augustine, who slipped out of the difficulty

by arguing that the corruptibility of the body, and not the body itself, is the depressing element, but left for further trouble the conclusion that the body is corruptible precisely because it is body—that is to say, material. Linked with other forms of dualism from farther East, the dualism of spirit and matter became the parent alike of Gnosticism and of Manichæism. Against these the Christian Church maintained with Hebraic simplicity the unit of human nature. It was as yet unconsciously Aristotelian; in after ages it was to adopt of set purpose the peripatetic doctrine that the soul is the form of the body, making the entelechy Man. Already soul and body were distinguishable, though not in that philosophic sense, but man as a whole might be called indifferently either soul or flesh; St. Paul's ship carried two hundred and seventy-six souls; the Son of God has received power over all flesh. So the resurrection of the flesh meant the raising of the whole man from death, but the part of the flesh was emphasized because that was chiefly called in question.

The emphasis was a challenge to the current dualism, and the challenge was fairly met. The raising of the trumpery flesh—if indeed it was nothing worse than trumpery—its assumption into the life of the resurrection, its supposed enrichment with spiritual qualities, were treated with derision. The whole thing was an incongruity, dishonourable to the spiritual essence; indeed, an absurdity. The objections raised to-day do not differ much from these. We no longer entertain the Gnostic contempt for matter, but there is an echo of it when men deride "gross views of the resurrection."

Origen thought to meet the difficulties of his time by a subtle distinction. The flesh would be raised, but it would not be "this flesh." To account for another flesh, and at the same time to identify it with the flesh that died, he introduced the physiological conception of a germinative principle, which gathers material to the body and replaces what is worn out, the body remaining always the same self. In the resurrection this germinative principle would operate afresh on new material of a kind suited for its new environment. There were awkward questions about teeth and suchlike things. Tertullian the literalist, who loved difficulties, revelled in them. No teeth? How then could there be gnashing of teeth? Origen got rid of these questions by suggesting that in the resurrection the body would have no superfluous members. His enemies said that he reduced this body to a perfect sphere. More serious objections were raised, and the Church rejected his teaching in this, as in other particulars.

Defenders of the Creed on the literalist side were even less

happy in their arguments, though they escaped condemnation. It was commonly said that the resurrection of the flesh was specified because the flesh alone died, the soul being immortal. But this was to accept the very dualism against which the affirmation of the Creed was directed; and it implied —though the conclusion was not drawn—a denial of the death and resurrection of the man taken as a whole. Indeed, the Platonizing dualism of spirit and matter, when freed from the implication of an evil principle in matter, was generally assimilated by Christian theology, and kept up the sense of an incongruity in the resurrection of the flesh. Men could not rationalize it, and so they had to postulate a miracle. But the postulation of miracle is merely a confession of ignorance; for when knowledge comes in, as St. Augustine remarked in the case of the magnet, an incident ceases to be miraculous.

If the schools of theology in the thirteenth century had more whole-heartedly accepted Aristotle's system of matter and form, the trouble might have been to some extent abated; but the Platonic dualism was not entirely cast out, and it returned full flood with the Renaissance. The Cartesian physics gave it a sharper accent, and the modern world settled down to a division of thought which tended, on the one hand to pure materialism, on the other hand to a spiritualism looking for complete escape from all that is material.

Into that world I was born. As soon as I began to ask about such things at all, the resurrection of the flesh became a source of untold perplexity. Before leaving school I had already learnt to read into the atomism of Lucretius the atomic theory of Dalton; it was no mere speculation of philosopher or poet, but an established fact of science, that matter was so constituted. I pictured to myself without hesitation those infinitesimal globules, impenetrable, indestructible, possessed of unchangeable elemental qualities, which formed by their agglomeration and combination the whole system of visible and tangible existence. I knew that my body was composed of them. I believed also, with perfect simplicity, in the existence of my soul, which was not so composed, and was of a wholly different immaterial character. I understood that my soul somehow inhabited my body, but the relation between them was perplexing. They were so disparate. There were hardy materialists who saved themselves much trouble. They were entirely dogmatic and strictly orthodox. I tried to interest a fellow-freshman in some spiritist phenomena which were much discussed. "I refuse to believe in such things," he said, "because if I did I could not be a materialist." I essayed a suggestion that perhaps the spirits themselves were

material, but this was rejected as an evasion. There was a formula often quoted: "The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." I thought this not unreasonable; but then I wanted to know how the liver can secrete bile, and why it ceases to do so when a man is hanged. This enquiry, however, was tabu; it happens so, and there's an end on't. To us all alike came Tyndall's presidential address at the meeting of the British Association in Belfast—to some as a gospel, to others as a catastrophe. The atom was king. Mortimer Collins, whom we loved, poked fun at his atomic majesty in light verse; but kings can survive satire.

One got to philosophy. Aristotle's Ethics and Politics were in request, but his Metaphysics were treated with something like contempt, on the ground that his natural history was evidently defective and he knew no chemistry. The ground now seems inadequate, but I think my memory is correct. Plato served to confirm us in dualism, and was useful chiefly against the monists of materialism. When I was introduced to Berkeley, probably in my third year at Oxford, there seemed to be some light. I did not run to exaggeration. I was convinced that if the material world was constructed by mind, it was nevertheless a construction of reality. Atomism—the new atomism of which Berkeley knew nothing—might be purely constructive, but it was the only possible construction. The dominion of spirit seemed to be assured, but nevertheless the reality behind the construction of matter remained separate and disparate; indeed, it was more disparate than ever. It was still incongruous to the idea of resurrection; and the mental construction of it was even more incongruous, being evidently appropriate and peculiar to our present state of existence. I remember a long evening spent with George William Gent, most patient of men, in discussion of these things; we came to the suspensive judgment that we knew nothing about them, but that we probably should know something—when we had enjoyed the advantage of dying. He has had that advantage for a long time now; but now I am not so sure that it is an advantage. Resurrection from death seems to be a more important change.

Away from Oxford speculation became less engrossing; but it did not cease, and it was in a way more imperative; I had to justify, if I could, my public profession of belief in the resurrection of the flesh. The authority of the Catholic Church might be sufficient for me, but I had to justify it to others. I made some tentative returns to physiology, always interrupted, always inadequate. What was this flesh? It dawned upon me that, although I might talk of eating swine's flesh,

what I was eating was not really flesh at all, but only some relics of what had been flesh. For flesh, in any true sense of the word, is living flesh; when life is gone it is no longer what it was. The liver when living can secrete bile; the calf's liver that I ate could not; it was not the same thing. This might be atomic matter; that other was something more. And every cell of living flesh is alive. And life means soul, whether of plant or calf or man; and soul means the life of flesh. The soul does not merely inhabit the flesh; it is an essential part of it. And the soul of man is what I know as spirit; I cannot speak for plants and calves. I got hold at last of the peripatetic doctrine that the soul is the form of the body. The clear line drawn between spirit and matter was blurred. When my spirit prayed, cells of my brain were functioning.

There still remained the atomic matter of my flesh, which after death would be that and nothing more. What had this to do with spirit? What spiritual value could there be in relics of the saints? How should they work miracles? What should atomic matter have to do with the exalted life of the resurrection?

I do not know that the thought of a "physical integument" ever occurred to me, as it has recently occurred to Mr. Major. If it had, I should probably have made a double reply. In the first place, soul is just as much a physical reality as body, and so the adjective may go. And, secondly, my body is not an integument, a covering of my naked personality: it is part and parcel of that personality. My coat is an integument, but my skin is not, except in the anatomical sense—I believe it is so used—as enclosing muscles and nerves and internal organs. Along with these it is part of myself. If I shed it, for a time or for ever, I am no longer altogether myself. It will crumble to indistinguishable dust when I die; if I am to become again my whole self in the resurrection, I must in some way resume it. In what way? What place will there be for atomic matter to be newly informed with life?

So I still stammered over the resurrection of the flesh, though the idea began to seem less absurd. If my living flesh is not mere atomic matter, there is my dead flesh to consider. Will "this flesh" cease to be, or can it be held over in suspense, to be revived? The chasm between spirit and residual matter was unbridged. I was told to go to St. Paul for a more spiritual conception of resurrection; he said that flesh and blood were not to inherit the Kingdom of God. He did; but I doubted whether he knew much about the physical ordering of our flesh, and I could see that he was groping after something. "All flesh is not the same flesh." Obviously not;

there is flesh of men, of beasts, of birds, and of fishes. That does not take us far. "There are also celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial." But now he is skirting physical theories which have lost their interest. Of one thing he is sure: the fact of resurrection. What was sown in corruption will be raised in incorruption; what was sown as animal body will be raised as spiritual body. "If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual body." I had to confess that I did not know what this means, and commentators differ. Is he contrasting spirit and flesh? Possibly, for elsewhere in the same epistle he seems to make "animal man" equivalent to "carnal man." Possibly, for the contrast of flesh and spirit is not the same thing as the distinction of spirit and matter, which seems to be foreign to his thought. Then is flesh sown and spirit raised? Is that the meaning of flesh not inheriting, as corruption cannot inherit incorruption? Does corruptible flesh pass clean away for ever? Certainly not; for there is another burst of confidence: "This corruptible must put on incorruption." The corruptible flesh itself, though it may not inherit, will nevertheless be endowed with the incorruptibility of the Kingdom of God. Whence this assurance? It appealed to me as an ethical necessity, as in the first age of the Church. If "this flesh" is to end in corruption, perhaps it will not matter much to what kind of corruption it goes in the meanwhile. I could feel the pressure of that argument, and I understood that the Church had done well in setting Origen aside. I knew that if my flesh was not saved from corruption it would go ill with my soul; I could not cut myself loose from the lot of my body. I was even disposed to quarrel with the Burial Service, for I did not wish to be "delivered from the burden of the flesh." What I desired was strength to carry the flesh lightly. I looked elsewhere in St. Paul's writings, and found that he too, though finding his earthly tabernacle burdensome, did not wish to be unclothed, but rather to be overclothed. A naked soul is no man; there was perhaps more of truth than we readily allow in Hebrew conceptions of Sheol, or the Homeric dreams of Hades. "The souls of the righteous are in the hands of God, and no torment shall touch them." Good; but that is only negative bliss; they await—it is St. Paul again who gives the word—the redemption of the body. So on every account the resurrection of the flesh was to be expected. But still the inherent deadness of those obstinate atoms was in the way. One was inclined to appropriate an aspiration: "Oh, that this too too solid flesh would melt!"

The first relief came when Lord Kelvin showed that vortex rings formed in imponderable ether would be indestructibly

stable and have other qualities of the atom. Was this the true nature of matter? If so, it was not inert; it was a manifestation of energy, which would be required to account for the movement of the vortices. But for me energy meant spirit. The only force of which I know anything at first hand is that which I myself consciously exercise when I do things. If I am to argue from the known to the unknown—and there is no other pathway of knowledge open to me—I must infer that other apparent forces are fundamentally of the same kind; and conscious energy is precisely what we mean by spirit. So on this new hypothesis matter was a manifestation of spirit. Was the chasm bridged? Not altogether; for the supposed force would be working on the supposed imponderable ether, which would thus be the ultimate basis of matter. The existence of this ether was at that time taken almost as axiomatic. And it was inert. The chasm yawned again between spirit and this inert mass—no, not mass, but massless basis of mass—this *informis materia* to which, in spite of Aristotle, scientific investigation apparently brought us. What room was there for this inert basis in the resurrection?

The hypothesis was tested, and discarded. But the testing led to new hypotheses; and the new hypotheses led to successful experiment, with amazing results. The impenetrable, indestructible atom began to dissolve before our eyes. Well, no—not before my own eyes; for whatever approximation to knowledge about these things I may seem to have attained was secured, to say the least, at second hand. I am afraid to use words about it, lest I stumble into absurdity. But trying so to learn, I seem to understand that the atom is resolved into movements of energy, which are normally constant—whence the stability of matter—but which may be disturbed. I am concerned with the normal movement, not with disturbances. Given this, normal matter is nothing else but movement of energy—that is to say, a manifestation of spirit. It is not unreal, an illusion of spirit; we are not brought back to the corrupt following of Berkeley; on the contrary, it is real with the more knowable reality of spirit. The logical distinction of matter and spirit holds good, as does the logical distinction of matter and form, but it is not *in rerum natura*. Matter is but one operation of spirit. The chasm is bridged; or, rather, it is closed.

I had written thus far with much fear of presumption, when I took up, even before putting the last sentence on paper, an account of the latest developments and experiments in this field, written by an apparently competent observer. There I read that the electron, "the ultimate constituent of matter," is not itself material. It is "content without a container."

And so the conclusion is drawn: " The material world is mind." Immediately after reading this, I was called by the cathedral bells to mattins, and we sang: " O all ye works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord."

There is no longer any incompatibility of spirit and matter. A spiritual body is no contradiction in terms. The one fundamental difficulty hindering belief in the resurrection of the flesh is gone. That is all. The result is negative. But it clears the ground for affirmation. Resurrection is the victory of man over death in the fulness of his manhood. It is more than immortality of the soul; how much more, who knows? I know no more than I did thirty years ago how the dead are raised, or with what body they will come; but I am not on that account fool enough—I use St. Paul's rough word—to deny, or even to doubt. On grounds which seem to me sufficient, I can say without stammering that I believe in the resurrection of this flesh.

T. A. Lacey.

CHURCH LIFE AS PICTURED IN CRABBE

I

It has often been remarked of late that George Crabbe, after long years of neglect, is at last coming into his own. It is well if this is true. For Crabbe offers to our own and succeeding ages a distinct presentment of the manners and morals of his times. His homely pages abound in vivid pictures attractive to all who find " the proper study of mankind " an engrossing interest; and they teem in allusions to, and descriptions of, the social and religious life of the eighteenth century.

John Newton says somewhere in his *Cardiphonia* that the wisest students of history will be careful to trace in the history of all the ages the controlling and guiding hand of God. Such readers will discover in Crabbe much food for thought. They will find in his pages that perennial interest which the eighteenth century, midway between the semi-chivalrous Stuart period and the modern industrial world, always seems able to evoke; but also they will find much that has the deeper interest of suggesting forcibly the Divine overruling of the Church's life.

Few contemporary writers give us truer glimpses of Church life in this somewhat melancholy period than Crabbe; and that for several reasons.

In the first place, Crabbe's knowledge of English life covers wide ground. He thoroughly and intimately knew the poor,

the tradesmen and farmers, and his fellow-clergy; whilst his early domestic chaplaincy to the Duke of Rutland gave him considerable insight into the ways of the great.

Secondly, though Crabbe is often quoted as an inefficient or negligent priest, he had no small portion of a priest's heart. We see that in his intense sympathy with the poor, and in his interest in theological questions.

Then, too, Crabbe's extraordinary powers of observation and his retentive memory make him a really effective witness to contemporary ways, whether in Church or society. In his pictures details stand out with an almost photographic minuteness which impresses and almost startles the reader.

This impression of exact detail gives us extraordinary confidence in the fidelity of the poet's descriptions; and when we have made due allowance for a somewhat strong pessimistic note, we shall suspect him of very little, if any, exaggeration. In this respect he differs from Cowper. Cowper's impatience with the Church life of his day led him to a satire which gained pungency, but lost some of its effectiveness, by its bitterness. Crabbe neither is reformer enough, nor feels keenly enough, to be led into this defect, but is content to describe things faithfully as they are.

II

Here we are considering Crabbe's description of Church life, not of the social life, of his time.

The poet deals very little with movements, but much with persons; herein he shows the rural mind. Indeed, it is the concreteness of his sketches which makes them so extraordinarily vivid. Thus it is from Crabbe's descriptions of individual parish priests rather than of religious movements that we learn something of the Church tone of his day. His poetry contains quite a gallery of ecclesiastical portraits. Whilst these seem to represent somewhat conventional types, they are also probably sketches from the life; and, indeed, ideas *are* conventional just because they mirror actual commonplace life. The familiar types are all there, enshrined for all time in the vivid pages: the lordly rector, the starving curate, the Methodistic Evangelical, the hunting and card-playing priest, the eager seeker for preferment. In *Burials* Crabbe introduces an aged sexton, and uses his garrulousness in order to introduce a description of the five rectors under whom the old man had served: the majestic Adler, who died in the pulpit; Peele, the inveterate jester, even in rebuke; Grandspear, the bountiful; the " Author-

Rector," possibly meant as a description of Crabbe himself; and the young and fervid "Simeonite" from Cambridge.*

No one who reads the long poem entitled *The Parish Register*, of which *Burials* is a portion, will be surprised at Crabbe being described as the owner of a priestly heart. In this poem a parish priest, according to his wont at the end of each year, reviews the events recorded in his parochial registers—the baptisms, weddings, funerals; and dwells in sympathy, and often in sorrow, upon the tale of vice or happiness or suffering which the entries recall to his memory. None but a priest could well have written such a poem, with its underlying note of pastoral care and yearning for the welfare of his flock.

The reader will notice that Crabbe takes it for granted that the parish priest is intimately conversant with the joys, sorrows, and sins of all his parishioners. The eighteenth-century parson seems at least to have known his parishioners. It is true that he was not expected to practise house-to-house visiting, like his successor of to-day. But his population was smaller; and he had other methods of knowing his flock individually (he did not, for instance, despise a seat in the village inn of an evening), and seems to have used well such opportunities as outdoor sports and festivities gave him. As a matter of fact, it may be held rather uncertain how far pastoral visiting in the eighteenth century would have been altogether welcomed by parishioners. The father of the Wesleys, when Rector of Epworth, found his people unfriendly, if not actually hostile to him. They are said to have set fire more than once to his house and stacks. Fletcher of Madeley encountered bitter opposition in his pastoral efforts. Doubtless the personal collection of tithe in kind did not aid friendly relations between priest and people. The old well-known folk-song of the parson coming to the farmer to choose his tithe-pig from the sty, and, in his greed to capture the best of the litter, slipping headlong in the sty's filth, portrays an undignified and none too popular conception of the rural parson. But however much or little influence the eighteenth-century priest possessed amongst his parishioners, it is probable (and the stagnation of country life helped in this) that he knew them better than the parson of to-day, when enormous rectories and the possession of motor-cars have helped to emphasize the social distinction between shepherd and flock.

Certain is it, at any rate, that Crabbe's own very intimate understanding of the poor, and of their ways and thoughts, could be acquired only by one who had observed and thought deeply and continually about the daily lives of his flock.

* This poem was published in 1807, and thus takes us into the early years of the nineteenth century; but what is true of the later years of the eighteenth century will fairly well describe the early years of the nineteenth.

III

Here, then, we have an artist conscientious, observant, sympathetic. What is the picture of Church life which he draws for us ?

Well, we find in his pages exactly the same phenomenon as in all contemporary literature: an appalling degradation of popular manners and morals, especially in the lowest and highest classes; and, at the same time, more than glimpses of an undercurrent of genuine and deep piety, strong enough to forbid our stamping the age as wholly irreligious.

On the whole, the English clergy appear, in Crabbe's pages, as a decent-living, unambitious, and distinctly somnolent class, with very little spirituality, but not altogether without regard or respect for their pastoral office. The average parish priest was doubtless a better-living man than most of his parishioners, though sometimes over-addicted to the bottle or to sport. He gave no lead in combating the vices of the day, and stood out in no marked way as superior to his flock in the higher aspirations and practices. On the whole, he stood for a conventional and unenthusiastic decency, and was contented with that—a position which was far from satisfying those of his flock who had been really stirred by some moving of the Spirit. Canon Ainger suggests that the portrait which Crabbe drew in the *Tales of the Hall* of an incumbent is obviously meant for the author himself as his dissenting parishioners saw him:

> " A moral teacher !" some, contemptuous, cried;
> He smiled, but nothing of the fact denied,
> Nor, save by his fair life, to charge so strong replied.
> Still, though he bade them not on aught rely
> That was their own, but all their worth deny,
> They called his pure advice his cold morality.

Morality, apart from a dogmatic basis, is singularly uninspiring for most men. Uncertainty as to the great truths of revealed religion (and eighteenth-century Englishmen were very dubious as to any certain revelation) naturally resulted in timidity in God's messenger, and in the sounding of an uncertain trumpet. Crabbe, in the *Borough*, describes the desire for peace which filled the minds of many incumbents who, in the face of " Methodist " teaching, preferred, as far as possible, to let sleeping dogs lie:

> His constant care was, no man to offend;
> No haughty virtues stirr'd his peaceful mind,
> Nor urged the priest to leave the flock behind;
> He was his Master's soldier, but not one
> To lead an army of His martyrs on:
> Fear was his ruling passion.

This timidity and lack of spiritual fervour, partly due to the intellectual position of the times, was much increased by the great poverty of the lesser clergy. Macaulay has pointed out that the clergy of this period might be roughly divided into two classes—the great and wealthy, who moved at ease amongst the gentry and nobility; and, on the other hand, the inferior clergy, who were more at home amongst the servants in large houses, and whose children frequently went into domestic service or to farm labour.

When a man's bread and butter, and that of his family, depends largely upon his popularity, it is hardly possible for him to teach definite doctrines, regardless of their acceptability to his hearers, with courage and independence. Crabbe, in the poem quoted above, draws a painful picture of the poverty of a curate, scholarly, pious, but always in debt and want. The existing system of patronage, if that could be called system when preferment depended almost wholly upon wire-pulling, increased this evil; and we have in Crabbe, as elsewhere, pitiable glimpses of the servility of applicants for benefices, or of domestic chaplains who were glad to rank among the hired servants of the nobility.

Worse than such timidity and lack of independence was the scandal of negligent or sensual priests. In *The Village* the dying pauper longs in vain for spiritual ministrations; his parish priest is bent only upon sport:

> Fain would he ask the parish-priest to prove
> His title certain to the joys above:
> For this he sends the murmuring nurse, who calls
> The holy stranger to these dismal walls:
> And doth not he, the pious man, appear,
> He, "passing rich with forty pounds a year"?
> Ah! no; a shepherd of a different stock,
> And far unlike him, feeds this little flock:
> A jovial youth, who thinks his Sunday's task
> As much as God or man can fairly ask;
> The rest he gives to loves and labours light,
> To fields the morning, and to feasts the night;
> None better skill'd the noisy pack to guide,
> To urge their chase, to cheer them or to chide;
> A sportsman keen, he shoots through half the day,
> And, skill'd at whist, devotes the night to play:
> Then, while such honours bloom around his head,
> Shall he sit sadly by the sick man's bed,
> To raise the hope he feels not, or with zeal
> To combat fears that e'en the pious feel?

When at last the pauper dies, the lazy chaplain even fails to put in an appearance at the funeral:

> Now to the church behold the mourners come,
> Sedately torpid and devoutly dumb;
> The village children now their games suspend,
> To see the bier that bears their ancient friend;
> For he was one in all their idle sport,

And like a monarch ruled their little court.
The pliant bow he formed, the flying ball,
The bat, the wicket, were his labours all;
Him now they follow to his grave, and stand
Silent and sad, and gazing, hand in hand;
While bending low, their eager eyes explore
The mingled relics of the parish poor:
The bell tolls late, the moping owl flies round,
Fear marks the flight and magnifies the sound;
The busy priest, detain'd by weightier care,
Defers his duty till the day of prayer:
And, waiting long, the crowd retire distress'd,
To think a poor man's bones should lie unbless'd.

The truth is that the average Englishman of the eighteenth century (witness Mr. Edwards's oft-quoted remark to Dr. Johnson) conceived a "living" not as a cure of souls so much as a sinecure, a quiet haven of peace, little troubled by duties of any kind except on Sundays:

"What is a Church?"—Let Truth and Reason speak,
They would reply, "The faithful, pure and meek;
From Christian folds, the one selected race,
Of all professions, and in every place."
"What is a Church?"—"A flock," our vicar cries,
"Whom bishops govern and whom priests advise;
Wherein are various states and due degrees,
The bench for honour, and the stall for ease;
That ease be mine, which, after all his cares,
The pious, peaceful prebendary shares."

It was from such a state of things as this that "Methodism," gradually leading to Dissent, naturally had its origin. The Methodist claimed that timidity and sloth were unbecoming in a messenger of the Gospel, the delivery of which called for all the courage and fire a man possessed; and he gradually relinquished the hope of finding these in the Church:

"Show me the churchman who will rise and pray
Through half the night, though lab'ring all the day,
Always abounding—show me him, I say:"—
Thus cries the preacher, and he adds, "Their sheep
Satan devours at leisure as they sleep.
Not so with us; we drive him from the fold,
For ever barking and for ever bold:
While they securely slumber, all his schemes
Take full effect—the devil never dreams."*

The Church of Crabbe's days—as, indeed, the Church of most days—was deeply conservative, and the average parson resented change. His attitude is, no doubt, accurately shown in such lines as these—though the general meaning of the passage is somewhat obscure:

* Crabbe must surely have had in his mind Bishop Latimer's pungent criticism of the non-preaching clergy of his day: "One . . . is the most diligent prelate or preacher in all England. And will ye know who it is? I will tell you: it is the devil. . . . He is never out of his diocese: he is never from his cure; ye shall never find him unoccupied . . . ye shall never find him idle, I warrant you."

For sects he cared not; "They are not of us,
Nor need we, brethren, their concerns discuss;
But 'tis the change, the schism at home I feel:
Ills few perceive, and none have skill to heal;
Not at the altar our young brethren read
(Facing their flock) the decalogue and creed;
But at their duty, in their desks they stand,
With naked surplice, lacking hood and band:
Churches are now of holy song bereft,
And half our ancient customs chang'd or left;
Few sprigs of ivy are at Christmas seen,
Nor crimson berry tips the holly's green;
Mistaken choirs refuse the solemn strain
Of ancient Sternhold, which from ours amain
Comes flying forth from aile to aile about,
Sweet links of harmony and long drawn out.

Crabbe shared this common antipathy of Churchmen to such novelty as the "enthusiasm" of the Methodists, preferring the somnolence of the old régime to the uncertain extravagances into which the new preaching sometimes led its hearers. He writes harshly, even violently, of Wesley's preaching, and hardly more sympathetically of the young Simeonite vicar of the *Burials*:

Him in his youth a clamorous sect assail'd,
Advised and censured, flatter'd—and prevailed.
Then did he much his sober hearers vex,
Confound the simple, and the sad perplex;
To a new style his reverence rashly took;
Loud grew his voice, to threat'ning swell'd his look;
Above, below, on either side he gazed,
Amazing all, and most himself amazed:
No more he read his preachments pure and plain,
But launch'd outright, and rose and sank again:
At times he smiled in scorn, at times he wept,
And such sad coil with words of vengeance kept,
That our best sleepers started as they slept.

Methodist and Simeonite were forerunners of those gallant leaders of the Catholic revival who would have been equally abhorrent to Crabbe and to those who felt with him. It was characteristic of the eighteenth century to fear any spiritual movement.

IV

We see, then, in Crabbe, something of the resentment of those who see in spiritual matters a new power gathering force which they can neither understand nor control.

Side by side with this restlessness (it is really the restlessness of a giant trying to awake from sleep) we find in the Church evidences of a quiet devotional life which held its own amidst much surrounding unbelief and immorality. Some of Crabbe's happiest lines describe the pious poor. In a charming picture —all the more charming because of the appalling sketch of rural vice immediately following—he describes the cottage home of

the industrious and thrifty peasant, its furniture, its pictures, and its books:

> On shelf of deal beside the cuckoo-clock,
> Of cottage-reading rests the chosen stock;
> Learning we lack, not books, but have a kind
> For all our wants, a meal for every mind:
> The tale for wonder and the joke for whim,
> The half-sung sermon and half-groan'd hymn.
> No need of classing; each within its place,
> The feeling finger in the dark can trace; . . .
> There pious works for Sunday's use are found;
> Companions for that Bible newly bound;
> That Bible, bought by sixpence weekly sav'd,
> Has choicest prints by famous hands engraved;
> Has choicest notes by many a famous head,
> Such as to doubt have rustic readers led.

Here is a simple portrait of one who might well have dwelt in the home described above:

> A noble Peasant, Isaac Ashford, died.
> Noble he was, contemning all things mean,
> His truth unquestion'd, and his soul serene:
> Of no man's presence Isaac felt afraid;
> At no man's question Isaac look'd dismay'd:
> Shame knew him not, he dreaded no disgrace;
> Truth, simple truth, was written in his face.

The rector tells his feeling of loss when Isaac died:

> I feel his absence in the hour of prayer,
> And view his seat and sigh for Isaac there:
> I see no more those white locks thinly spread
> Round the bald polish of that honour'd head;
> No more that awful glance on playful wight,
> Compelled to kneel and tremble at the sight,
> To fold his fingers, all in dread the while,
> Till Mister Ashford soften'd to a smile;
> No more that meek and suppliant look in prayer,
> Nor the pure faith (to give it force) are there:—
> But he is bless'd, and I lament no more
> A wise good man contented to be poor.

Could words better than these depict the Evangelical lover of Scripture and good works ?

> Upon the sure and written Word she trusts,
> And by the Law Divine her life adjusts;
> She blames not her who other creed prefers,
> And all she asks is charity for hers.
> Her great example is her gracious Lord,
> Her hope his promise, and her guide his Word;
> Her quiet alms are known to God alone,
> Her left hand knows not what her right has done.

One of Crabbe's most charming poems, untouched by his prevalent pessimism, is entitled *Silford Hall, or The Happy Day*, in which he describes the happy day spent by an imaginative village lad who has been sent on an errand to a great country mansion, and is allowed to wander through its rooms, accompanied by the housekeeper. The lad, full of wonder, is especially moved by the chapel:

Then to the Chapel moved the friendly pair,
And well for Peter that his guide was there!
Dim, silent, solemn was the scene—he felt
The cedar's power, that so unearthly smelt;
And then the stain'd, dark, narrow windows threw
Strange, partial beams on pulpit, desk and pew;
Upon the altar, glorious to behold,
Stood a vast pair of candlesticks in gold!
With candles tall, and large, and firm, and white,
Such as the hall of giant-kings would light.

We note with interest the massive altar-lights; but it is something of a surprise to find the boy bowing reverently to sacred paintings in the picture-gallery:

The Scripture Pieces caused a serious awe,
And he with reverence looked on all he saw;
His pious wonder he express'd aloud,
And at the Saviour Form devoutly bow'd.

We shall hardly expect in Crabbe's pages to find much mention of the Blessed Sacrament. The Holy Eucharist played little part in the lives of Churchpeople in those days, though excellent manuals existed for the use of the devout; and lack of it left their religion drab and cheerless. Three or four times a year was the usual number of celebrations in the middle of the century in the ordinary parish church. In his *Poor of the Borough*, however, Crabbe tells of one church at least (Dr. Wickham Legg has told us of others) where the Sacrament was administered oftener, and the sexton—

Once in a month the sacramental bread
On cloth with wine upon the table spread.

The truth is that, whilst certain manuals maintained the high Eucharistic teaching of Laud and Andrewes and Ken (we have it continued in the Wesleys' hymns and writings), the English Church as a whole had little conception at this time of the Sacrament as a mystery or as a channel of divine grace.

* * * * * *

There we may well leave our subject. The tale is told. For a conception of religion which scoffs at fervent preaching, and has no faith in sacramental grace, can have little or no power to sway the hearts of men, or to change their sinful characters. At its best such a religion can but serve to keep alive for a while a sense of Christian decency, and be a quiet hearth, so to speak, from which, when the Holy Spirit fans the embers, may spring—as actually happened soon after Crabbe laid down his pen—a living flame of preaching zeal and of faith in those unseen realities which Sacraments unfailingly deliver.

Rev. G. Lacey May.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

A CORRESPONDENT, the Rev. Maurice Frost, sends us the following Latin and English verses. "The English verses," he says, "were written on the fly-leaf at the end of a copy of Mone's *Lateinische Hymnen des Mittelalters* which I borrowed the other day from a friend. The volumes formerly belonged to Walter Pater, and then passed to Lionel Johnson. . . . The correction in the copy is as it stands in the original, and the Latin text, which I also enclose, in case you have not got a copy by you, is as Mone prints it (but without the *var. leg.*)."

Filii præsentia
mater destituta,
Gabrielem nuntium
sic est allocuta:

"*Ave plena gratia,*
mihi protulisti,
nunc amaritudine
sum repleta tristi.

Subsequenter inquiens:
dominus est tecum,
heu jacet in tumulo,
non est ultra mecum!

Omnis benedictio,
quam tu spopondisti,
mihi fit contraria
propter mortem Christi."

(Mone's *Lateinische Hymnen des Mittelalters*, Vol. II., No. 443.)

No. 443.

Lost her Son, the Mother now
All forelorn remaineth:
And to Herald Gabriel
Thus the Mother plaineth:

"Once to me, *Hail, full of grace!*
Mad'st thou proclamation:
Now filled full of bitterness,
Mine is desolation.

Next, *The Lord is with thee!* thou
Saidest, standing by me:
Sorrow! in the tomb He lies;
He is no more nigh me.

Now unto my bane is turned
All thy benediction:
Through the death of Christ my Son,
Through His Crucifixion."

L. J.

IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

ADVICE ON BOOKS

If readers who require advice on courses of theological study or the choice of books care to write to the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., an attempt will be made to give them the required information. Sixpence in stamps should be sent to cover the cost of the necessary correspondence. It will frequently be necessary to refer the enquiry to an expert; a number of well-known scholars have consented to help in this way. Sometimes, especially in the summer months, there may be a little delay in answering. The Editor reserves the right to publish answers if they are of sufficient general interest. In such cases the initials of the correspondents will be given.

ON LEARNING HEBREW

A Leading Old Testament scholar gives this advice in response to an enquiry from a reader:

The best book, all things considered, to start with is Davidson's *Hebrew Grammar* (T. and T. Clark, 10s.). It is somewhat overloaded at the beginning with matter which the beginner may find difficult and hardly requires; and if the student can get some friend to point out the parts that may be omitted, so much the better. (For anyone who reads French, Touzard's *Grammaire Hébraïque* [Paris: Victor Lecoffre] is preceded by what the author calls *Premiers Éléments—i.e.*, about fifty pages of essentials. This is a far better introduction than anything I know in English.)

Having committed to memory the consonants, vowels, and other signs, the chief thing is to learn the division of syllables. For this I always recommend the reading of the paradigms of verbs and nouns (specially the former) at once. This is easier than reading a number of quite different words, as the radical consonants are always, or nearly always, the same. An additional advantage is that the forms are unconsciously impressed in the memory. When some fluency of reading has been attained, the grammar can be worked through. Davidson's order of arrangement is quite good. Here, again, the constant writing out of the various pronouns, nouns, and verbs is quite as good practice in writing Hebrew as the reading of them in reading Hebrew.

Some "Don'ts"

Don't think that Hebrew is a difficult language. When once the ability to read the words is attained, the language is easier than Greek or Latin.

Don't endeavour to make things easier by transliterating the Hebrew words. This will only be a stumbling-block.

Don't expect to understand the reason of all apparent anomalies all at once.

You will as soon as possible get on to easy portions of the Bible and practise inserting the points in an unpointed text. Having done this you refer to the pointed texts, and correct your mistakes with the help of Davidson.

The Pentateuch is done by the B.F.B.S. in unpointed Hebrew, price about 2s.

Dr. Greenup has published selections from the Historical Books, which may be had from him at St. John's College, Highbury, London, N. 5, price 1s.

NOTES

I.—TEXTUAL REVISION OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER

No. XXIV. of the Articles of Religion lays strictures upon "having publick Prayer in a tongue not understanded of the people." Referring originally to Services in Latin, it involves the general principle that ready understanding on the part of those who are to use the Prayer-Book must be a prime consideration, and that the "tongue," as the Baptism Service suggests, though not "vulgar" in the modern sense, should be that in *common* use.

The literature of the past should in most cases be carefully guarded in its original integrity as a storehouse of linguistic antiquarianism. No one, for instance, would suggest remodelling the words of Shakespeare or Spenser up to date.

But the purpose of the Prayer-Book is wholly different, and it is submitted that it is a very fatal policy, because of any devotion to medievalism, to impair the vivid force of its teaching for modern ears, and dull the fires which ought to melt the hearts of all hearers and kindle their souls to a more fervent spiritual life.

The remodelling of the Book of Common Prayer being at present in hand, it seems the right time to make alterations, long overdue, in the interest mentioned above. These may be grouped under three categories: A, Archaic terms; B, ambiguities; C, mistranslations.

A.—The use of archaic terms and phrases is objectionable in itself only in so far as it may accentuate the idea of *unreality* in the Liturgy by suggesting a sense of aloofness from the ordinary language and life of the people, with whom it is wise to keep it in the closest possible touch. But whenever a word conveys a distinctly incorrect impression to ordinary readers or hearers, because of the change which has passed upon its meaning in modern use, it can hardly be questioned that the word should be altered.

The examples which follow have been chosen out from among many, because they all can be traced back through the 1662 Prayer-Book, and that of 1552, to the First Prayer-Book of Edward VI. After *four centuries* it is hardly unreasonable to expect that some re-editing should be necessary.

These fall naturally into *three* classes: (i.) Words, by this time, in common parlance practically unknown; (ii.) those which now give rise to misunderstanding; (iii.) those which have actually in course of time *reversed* their meaning.

(i.) Of the first class, words by this time commonly unknown or very little understood, take these: Affiance, assuage, chambering, charity

(for "love"—N.B.: "this charitable work of ours"—Baptism Service), concupiscence, endue, frailty, kindly (fruits), privy (conspiracy), sabaoth, succour,* vouchsafe, wist (ye not), whether of twain.

"Quick," when it comes along with "dead" is probably understood in the Creed; but hardly so in Ps. cxxiv. 2: "They had swallowed us up *quick*"; and in 1 Cor. xv. 42: "A quickening spirit" is made "life-giving" advisedly in the R.V.

In the case of the old-fashioned reflexive verb "endeavour ourselves" (which occurs in Preface of Confirmation Service, Collect 2nd after Easter, Ordination of Deacons [seventh promise], and of Priests [fifth promise]), will it not be well to leave out the pronoun, confusing to modern ears, a method which has already been inaugurated in the Baptism Service of "such as are of Riper Years"?

Besides these of four-century age, there are plenty of others of more recent introduction equally unknown—*e.g.*, "ordinance," commonly repeated in the Marriage Service by the commonalty "according to God's holy audience." Why not substitute "law"?

(ii.) Then, secondly, we have to face a group of words which give rise to actual *misunderstanding:*

(*a*) "Conversation" should be altered, because it no longer means "citizenship" as in Phil. iii. 20, nor "behaviour" as in 1 Pet. ii. 12 and iii. 1 (see Solemnization of Matrimony, twice, where to many bride-grooms the "conversation of the wives" probably seems a questionable way of winning them to righteousness).

(*b*) It is a pity for the Creed to continue telling the unlearned that it was "hell" our Lord descended into, rather than "Hades"† as in the Greek, or "grave."

(*c*) And we ought to cease putting a slur on "publicans" by coupling them constantly with "sinners." The word means "tax-gatherers" in ordinary English, and we ought to say so.

(*d*) We give a modern bridegroom a wrong impression when we put pledges on him to "worship" his bride.

(*e*) God cannot "be tempted with evil," so it will be well if the *Venite* ceases to suggest that the Jewish fathers "tempted Him."

(*f*) Then there is "vulgar" tongue in the Baptism Service. The adjective has assumed latterly an objectionable sense. It is interesting to note how the phrase presented a difficulty as long ago as the two Prayer-Books of 1549 and 1552. For though they do use the word "vulgar" in the rubric at the end of the Baptism Service, yet in the concluding Exhortation it takes the form "thenglische tounge," and in the rubrics at the beginning of Confirmation and between Catechism and Confirmation the much more desirable "*mother* tongue" is used.

(*g*) "Sudden death" in the Litany should be "unprepared death."

(*h*) "Until they *come of age* to take it upon themselves" suggests, to the many, twenty-one as the most suitable age for Confirmation. Why not say "of an age"?

(*i*) We ought to pray to be "*filled full*" with grace, rather than "fulfilled."

(*j*) "Blood of the New Testament" has, of course, no reference to

* Out of a Confirmation Class of twenty young people of between thirteen and, say, twenty years, not one knew what "succour" meant, one hazarding "obey" as a suggestion.

† See 1 Cor. xv. 55, last note on Burial of the Dead, at end of this article.

the *book*, as most people probably think. It should be "New Covenant."

(iii.) Further, there are some words which need altering, because they have practically *reversed* their meaning:

(*k*) "Let" by this time means the very opposite of "impede." It is only by being coupled with "hinder" that it conveys its original sense.

(*l*) "Prevent" should give place to "go before."

(*m*) We do NOT want our authorities to "minister justice *indifferently*" (Church Militant Prayer), but "impartially."

(*n*) "Wealth" is misleading. It is no longer synonymous with "well-being," but connotes "money." But it seems hardly wise to set our people praying, in this sense, for "wealth" for the King's Majesty. See also the second Royal Prayer in Holy Communion, and "all time of our *wealth*" in the Litany. Nor is there any need, when, even as early as 1662, "welfare" stood in this sense in the Prayer for Parliament.

(*o*) "*Lively* faith" in Article XXIX. smacks overmuch of revivalism. How much better "*living* faith" would be. The officiant, reading in the Baptism exhortation about babes made "lively members" of the Church, is likely to have suggested to his practical experience the more militant and less desirable sort of infants. In the first after-prayer in Holy Communion we present ourselves "lively sacrifices." This is a quotation from Rom. xii. 1, where in A.V. and R.V. alike the word used is "living." Also in the Occasional Prayers, "Thanksgiving for deliverance from Plague," we have "living sacrifice," showing that at the time of the Hampton Court Conference (1604), when these prayers are said to have been added, the Church was already at work remodelling archaisms.

(*p*) "Through the *satisfaction* of Thy Son" (Collect, 4th Advent) is a phrase which causes misunderstanding. If "propitiation" were substituted, we should not have it interpreted in the sense of *our* satisfying *Him*.

B.—There is a small group of passages in which *ambiguity* is caused by the existing wording, and yet could easily be removed:

(i.) *Evensong*.—Second Collect: "that both our hearts may be set," etc. Certainly some people see in this a suggestion that we have two hearts. "Both" is unnecessary. Omit it and all will be clear.

(ii.) *Holy Communion*.—"Drink ye all of it" is hardly English. It were better retranslated, "Drink of it, all of you," for fear lest "all" should be construed with "of it."

(iii.) *Public Baptism*.—"Save Noah and his family . . . from perishing by water" (1 Pet. iii. 20). As it stands, what non-Grecian will avoid linking "by water" with "perishing," instead of with "save" as in the original διεσώθησαν δι' ὕδατος. A.V. and R.V. avoid the trouble by leaving out the redundant "from perishing." R.V. margin: "were brought safely through water."

(iv.) In the last of the short intercessions after the Sponsors' promises in Public Baptism, it is far from obvious that "also" goes with "virtues" and not with "whosoever." This is a passage whose meaning is constantly lost through a wrong emphasis in reading, which should fall on "virtues," as is seen in the much clearer wording of the similar passage in Baptism of "such as are of Riper Years."

It would clearly be wiser to assimilate the wording in this and other cases in which a passage recurs; for instance, in other passages in Infant

and Adult Baptism, and in the Mosaic form of Blessing (Num. vi. 24), which is differently quoted in Visitation of Sick and in Commination.

It may not be out of place to suggest here that there are phrases commonly interpolated in the text, on the authority of custom alone, which it would be better to regularize by admission into the printed text.

Holy Communion.—Before and after the Gospel for the day, "Glory be to Thee, O Lord"—"Thanks be to Thee, {O Lord / O Christ,} for this Thy Holy Gospel."

"The Holy Gospel is written in the——chapter of {the Holy Gospel / that}."

"The Gospel" alone is hardly sufficient, since it does not gain special sanctity by being embodied in Holy Communion.

"Especially those for whom our prayers are desired." These words are as permissible in the Litany suffrage for the sick as in the prayer for "All Conditions": it will be found printed so in copies of the Prayer-Book published a hundred years ago.

Banns.—"These persons (respectively)" when there are more couples than one.

C.—The other great group of necessary alterations is exegetical. It is claimed that wherever Bible phrases are embodied in the text, they should be revised in the light of the best scholarship that is available. A considerable mass of such passages is to be found in the Epistles and Gospels for Sundays and Holy Days—*e.g.*, Epistles 2nd after Epiphany, Septuagesima, 3rd in Advent, and St. Matthias' Day.

This opens up a field of investigation obviously too large to be treated in detail in a short paper. This is the less necessary as the work lies obvious and ready to hand.

There are, however, many less obvious cases in which Biblical references are *embodied in the actual fabric* of the prayers.

It is the chief of these which it is proposed to deal with here, no reference being had to mere *verbal* differences, but only to those cases in which the present rendering may cause doctrinal error or misunderstanding. The retranslations are taken from the R.V., since, though its English is often defective, the text and exegesis are fairly up to date.

The Lord's Prayer

This has two variants in the Gospels, by using both of which its teaching power and therefore its spiritual value are enhanced. It seems a serious loss to rob our people of the usefulness of either version.

Matt. vi. 11.	*Luke xi.* 3.
"this day"—*σήμερον*	"day by day"—*τὸ καθ'ἡμέραν*
"forgive us our *debts* (*ὀφειλήματα*), as we forgive our debtors."	"forgive us our *sins* (*ἁμαρτίας*), for we ourselves also forgive everyone that is indebted to us."

There is also the doxology, rejected by many critics, yet supported by a large group of good MSS.

These variants are probably due to our Lord's having repeated the model of prayer oftener than once or twice in the course of His ministry.

Also there must be considered the uncertain rendering of *ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ*. R.V. text: "from the evil one"; A.V. and R.V. margin: "from evil."

In order that none of its teaching may be lost, it seems advisable that, whenever the Prayer occurs twice in the same Service, there shall be first a version of the Prayer according to St. Matthew, and secondly a version with the variants of St. Luke, one of these having the doxology, and that a version with bread "day by day" should come the second time in the Communion Office, and should be used in "The Churching of Women."

Passages in Matins and Evensong and Occasional Prayers

There are many retranslations in the R.V., especially in the Canticles, but in most cases they are not vital to the sense.

The following, however, seem to be important:

Prayer for Rain.—Instead of "that seek Thy kingdom* and the righteousness *thereof*" (Matt. vi. 33), which involves a mistranslation of *αὐτοῦ*, write: "Thy kingdom and Thy righteousness."

Ember Prayer.—For "lay hands *suddenly*" (1 Tim. v. 22), read "*hastily*."

Collects, Good Friday.—For "be made †one *fold* under one‡ Shepherd," read "one flock" (John x. 16)—a difference of far-reaching importance doctrinally. The mistranslation in the A.V. is the more curious as there is no question about *ποιμνή* in the text of the Greek.

Easter Anthem.—1 Cor. v. 8: "unleavened bread *of sincerity* (*εἰλικρινείας*) and truth." So A.V. and R.V., but in Collect 1st after Easter it appears as "pureness of living."†

SS. Simon and Jude, for "head cornerstone,"* read "chief cornerstone." R.V. Eph. ii. 20.

Holy Communion

**Offertory Sentences.*—Luke xix. 8: "If I have† done any wrong" should be "If I have wrongfully *exacted* aught."

*1 Cor. ix. 7: "Who goeth a warfare at any time §*of* his own cost?" should be "What soldier ever serveth at his own charges?" or "provides his own pay?"

*13: "live of the †sacrifice" should be { A.V. "live of" / R.V. "eat" } "the things of the temple."

*Gal. vi. 10: †"While we have time" should be "as we have opportunity" (A.V. and R.V.).

*1 Tim. vi. 19: †"attain eternal life" should be "lay hold on the life which is life indeed."

Heb. vi. 10: Omit †"and labour which proceedeth" (R.V.). But A.V. omits "which proceedeth" only.

* Means that the Prayer-Book version is not found even in A.V.

† Means that the rendering is in all Prayer-Books—1549, 1552, and 1662.

‡ See Proposals for Revision of Book of Common Prayer. Royal Letters of Business, No. 533.

§ "Of"—so 1662; but A.V. and the two "Edwards" read "at."

Gloria in Excelsis.—Luke ii. 14: *" Good will toward men " (in 1549 earlier in the Service). Here is a sad necessity. Both critical and theological considerations seem to require us to give up εὐδοκία, with its easy suggestions of universal salvation (even though it has a good deal of MSS. authority), for εὐδοκίας. How then translate it? R.V.: " Among men in whom He is well pleased "—an awkward pile of words. Weymouth has " Men, who please Him." Twentieth-Century New Testament: " In whom He finds pleasure." Best of all, perhaps, " Men of His good pleasure."

Public Baptism

" Born *anew* "* comes in the First Exhortation, as in R.V. (John iii. 3). " Born *again*," as in A.V., comes in the Prayer after the Lesson, and also in the Lesson of " Baptism . . . of Riper Years."

In the Prayer of Consecration (Matt. xxviii. 19): for " teach all nations " (1552, 1662), we must read, " make disciples of all nations."

In Baptism of . . . Riper Years, Exhortation (Mark xvi. 15): " Preach the Gospel to *every creature*," should be " the whole creation "; though " disbelieveth," in place of " believeth not," can hardly be said to commend itself. Later, Acts ii. 38: after " be baptized every one of you " reinsert " in the name of Jesus Christ," which Prayer-Book has omitted.

Solemnization of Matrimony

The Sermon.—Eph. v. 30: after " We are members of His Body " the following words, " of His flesh, and of His bones," should be deleted.

1 Pet. iii. 4: " The hidden man of the heart in that which is not corruptible, even the ornament " stands so in A.V. and 1662. Whereas R.V. has it, " the hidden man of the heart in the incorruptible apparel of."

And 1549, 1552, say: " But let the hyd man, which is in the heart, be without corruption, so that the spirit be mild and quiet, which is a precious thing in the sight of God."

Visitation of the Sick

Second Exhortation.—Heb. xii. 7: *" If (εἰ) ye endure chastening " should be " It is for (εἰς) chastening that ye endure." Εἰς for εἰ seems quite certain.

" God dealeth with you as with sons " (A.V., R.V., 1662); but 1549, 1552 have " He offereth Himself to you as unto His own children."

Burial of the Dead.

Second Sentence.—As in the Prayer-Book so is A.V. and 1662. Job xix. 25: are we to rewrite it, " And that He shall stand up at the last upon the earth. And after my skin hath been thus destroyed, yet from my flesh shall I see God "; or, as in 1549, 1552: " And that I shall rise out of the earth in the laste daye, and shall be covered again with my skinne, and shall see God in my flesh; yea, and I myselfe shall beholde Him not with other, but with these same iyes "?

Act of Committal.—†Phil. iii. 21: " He shall change *our vile body . . . His glorious Body." This should read (R.V.) " the body of our

* Means that the rendering is in all Prayer-Books—1549, 1552, and 1662.

† This and " one flock " in the Good Friday Collect are mentioned as necessary corrections in the Approved Proposals for Revision of the Book of Common Prayer, Royal Letters of Business, No. 533.

humiliation . . . the Body of His glory." So also Epistle 23rd after Trinity.*

Last Collect.—John xi. 26: *οὐ μὴ ἀποθάνῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*: "Shall not die* eternally"; but in the *First Sentence* it reads: "Shall never die," as A.V., R.V., 1662. In 1549, 1552 it is rendered ambiguously: "Shall not die for ever."

The Lesson furnishes several important instances—1 Cor. xv. 20, etc.

In verses 24 to 28 there is a confused tangle of pronouns of the 3rd person. Adequate *translation*, since its purpose is to express the *meaning* of the original in a language which is deficient in the definition of its pronouns, ought to substitute names for "he" so far as is needed to make all clear. Thus—in verse 24: "He" stands for "Christ" throughout. In verses 25, etc: "For Christ must reign until †God has put all enemies under *Christ's* feet. . . . For God has put all things under Christ's feet. But when God says, All things have been put under *Christ*, it is plain that *God* is excepted, who put all things under Him. And when everything has been put under Him, the Son will put Himself under God, who," etc.

There are two cases of *punctuation*, in verses 29 and 32, which need amending:

Verse 29: "If the dead rise not" goes with what follows. Not "What shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not?" but "If the dead rise not, why are they," etc.

Similarly, verse 32: "If the dead rise not" is to go with what follows. Not "What doth it profit me, if the dead rise not?" but "If the dead rise not, let us eat and drink, for," etc.

Verse 36: "Thou fool, that which *THOU sowest" (*σὺ ὃ σπείρεις*), emphasis of the strongest. Render then as R.V.: "That which thou *thyself* sowest," etc.

Verse 44: Not "There is* a natural body," but "*If* there is." Εἰ has overwhelming MSS. authority.

Verse 47: "The second man is [the Lord] from Heaven." R.V. omits *ὁ Κύριος*, and MSS. authority is slightly against it; and probably the balance of the sense leans the same way, "the *second man* is from heaven" being used in a *human* sense, meaning "the *spiritual* man," as distinguished from "the *natural* man."

Verse 55: R.V. gives "O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting?"; but the MSS. evidence for the change is only slight. In 1549, 1552 it reads: "Death, where is thy sting? *Hell*, where is thy victorye?"—*ποῦ σου, ᾅδη, τὸ κέντρον*; This latter question, which has the rather weaker MSS. evidence in the New Testament, is the form it takes in Hosea xiii. 14 (lxx.), from which St. Paul is evidently quoting. Thus *ᾅδης* is rendered "grave" in Prayer-Book and 1662, so that in the Creed, unless the Greek word "Hades" is retained, the sentence should run: "He descended into the *grave*."

AMBROSE J. WILSON.

OLDHAM CHURCH,
February, 1921.

* Means that the rendering is in all Prayer-Books—1549, 1552, and 1662.

† "God has put." This is not *certain*. It might be "Christ," referring back to verse 24; or "God," referring on to verse 27. But if, as is likely, it is a quotation from Ps. cx. 1, which our Lord quotes in Matt. xxii. 44, it will be "God."

II.—THE "FIRST RESURRECTION" AND THE "SECOND DEATH"

Liturgical References in Western Service-Books

Those who read this paper will not need to be reminded—(1) that the Biblical references to these two conceptions are confined to the Revelation of St. John the Divine—viz., Rev. ii. 11, xx. 5, 6, 14, xxi. 8, and only one of these (xx. 5 and 6) speaks of the "First Resurrection";* and (2) that the author of the references was without doubt identified in the minds of those who made use of them for liturgical purposes with St. John the Apostle and the Evangelist, "the disciple whom Jesus loved."

The liturgical references are, of course, much less familiar to the ordinary reader, even if he be something of a student of liturgies, and they are not without a certain interest, as I propose to show. No use of the passages I have quoted, so far as my reading goes, is made in Eastern service-books, and in the West references are most frequent and characteristic in the Mozarabic rite. This fact suggests that it was a favourite thought in Spain, and possibly that it came over into that country from the North African Church, where St. Augustine had been the first to give it a new, spiritual interpretation. On this point Dr. Swete's valuable note on pp. 264 *ff.* of his commentary should be consulted (also Robertson, *Regnum Dei*, p. 170). He finds no analogy between Rev. xx. 5 and 1 Thess. iv. 16 or 1 Cor. xv. 23: for in the Revelation it is only martyrs and confessors, not all the faithful, who are included in the First Resurrection; but there is apparently a "resurrection to judgment" (which we must suppose is included in the General Resurrection at the last day, unless this latter be a different and somewhat contradictory conception of the future), and that will be followed by the "Second Death"; while he shows that St. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xx. 7) inaugurated a new method of interpretation on right lines, though in some details perhaps inexact—a method which has generally been followed ever since. To St. Augustine the First Resurrection means "the spiritual share in the Resurrection of Christ which belongs to the baptized" in this life (Col. iii. 1), and the "Second Death" means the final destruction of the ungodly in the "lake of fire" (Rev. xxi. 8).

For the reason given above I start with the Mozarabic books. In the Missal the *oratio ad pacem* for Thursday in Easter week runs thus: "Deus Pater omnipotens qui tanta caritate mundum dilexisti ut pro eo unigenitum tuum volueris crucifigi: pretioso nos filii tui sanguine redemptos ita opulentos caritatis fructibus effice ut per hoc et **in resurrectione prima** habeamus partem et potestatem non timeamus **mortis secunde.**" This prayer is given in full because it has had, no doubt, a certain vogue since Dr. Bright translated it in his *Ancient Collects* (p. 58).

In the *Liber ordinum* (ed. Férotin) I find nine allusions to one or other of the expressions or both. (1) Of these, that in a *missa de penitentibus* (col. 358) is much the most interesting. Here the *inlatio* (preface) ends:

* The nearest approach to the two ideas is in Dan. xii. 2 and 3, and St. John v 29, adduced by Swete in his commentary on the book (see also Archdeacon Lee in the *Speaker's Commentary, in loco*). Swete also quotes a still closer parallel to the thought of "two deaths" from Philo, and adds, "The exact expression was probably current in Jewish circles, for it occurs frequently in the Targums" (p. 33; see also his note on p. 274). The actual expression "First Resurrection," though involved in the thought of the "Second Death," does not appear to have been actually in use till St. John used it here.

" quatenus (in order that) in **prima resurrectione que in hac vita consistit,** per humilem confessionem partem habentes, post huius vite terminum te cum angelis et archangelis conlaudare valeant": the gloss on the " prima resurrectio," coming as it does in a form for penitents that they may be restored to their baptismal innocence (" locum pristine dignitatis valeant obtinere . . . quem dudum meruerunt per sacri baptismatis undam), is clearly in accordance with St. Augustine's spiritual interpretation.

The other references are in burial prayers and have the pre-Augustinian application—viz.:

(2) Col. 117: " exsurgentibus nobis Domine in similitudinem crucis, locum **prime resurrectionis** ostende ut quum in concilio iustorum [tuam] ostenderis faciem **secunda** in nobis **mors** non habeat potestatem. . . ." The interest of this prayer centres not round the phrases we are concerned with, but round the thought that when we rise from the grave it will be " in similitudinem crucis"; this is probably an allusion to the stone or wooden cross which usually stood at the head of the graves in Spain (see Dom Férotin's note *in loco*), and so means not " in the form of a cross," but " under the shadow of, or up to, the cross, under whose protection we have been lying."

(3) Col. 125: " . . . dele ei delicta sua atque peccata usque ad novissimum quadrantem ut **secunda mors** in eum non habeat potestatem. . . ." This Biblical reference (St. Matt. v. 26) recurs in the Gallican books (*e.g.*, Gal. 750, Mur.), but there the expression " ut secunda mors" etc., is replaced by a more general phrase (" tecumque immortalitatis vitam et regnum consequatur aeternum").

(4) Col. 134: the *completuria* (post-communion collect) ends with a very similar petition.

(5) Col. 149: " . . . ab exitio **mortis secunde** ereptus. . . ."

(6) Col. 207: " ut . . . habentes partem **prime resurrectionis** exultemus."

(7) Col. 416: " . . . foraesta quaesumus ut fideles tui sacerdotes spem glorie [et] **prime resurrectionis** apud te consortium mereantur."

(8) Col. 430: " ut adscripti in libro iustorum sortem **prime resurrectionis** obtineant. . . ."

(9) Col. 446: " quatenus (= ut) **prime resurrectionis** obtineant partem . . . ut eruti a **morte secunda.** . . ."

In the Breviary I have found no mention of these two matters, nor is it altogether likely that one should. But the instances I have collected from the other two chief service-books are sufficient to establish my contention, though it must not be imagined that there are not, side by side with the expressions I have adduced, a considerable number of the more usual expressions found in other rites.

Still more is that the case when we turn to the " Gallican" books. In them there are several instances where the First Resurrection occurs; only one, I think, of the Second Death—viz., in the Bobbio Missal (p. 129, H.B.S.) in a lection for the living and the dead (said to be from St. Paul's Epistle to the Colossians, but in reality a strange congeries of all sorts of statements): " . . . qui negant mandata eius adquirunt ruinam et in hoc **secunda**[**m**] **morte**[**m**]." But the First Resurrection occurs more often:

(1) Bobbio Missal (p. 161, H.B.S.) in a *missa sacerdotis defuncti* . . . in **prima resurrectione** facias praesentari." In the funeral rites of the Gelasian Sacramentary (749 and 750, Mur.) the First Resurrection is referred to in four places* (and " *beata* resurrectio" twice)—viz.,

* The Leofric Missal (ed. Warren, pp. 200*f.*) likewise has them: see also a Salzburg Pontifical quoted by Martène (*de antiq. Eccl. rit.* lib. iii., cap. xv., ordo vi.).

(*a*) "habeat partem in **prima resurrectione**" (*b*) "in parte **prime resurrectionis** resuscitet"; (*c*) "in **prima resurrectione** facias praesentari"; (*d*) "partem habeat in **prima resurrectione** quam facturus est (sc. Dominus) orantibus **sanctis.**" These last two words are specially to be noticed as introducing the efficacious intercession of the saints, though strangely enough the Leofric book, which is later, has only "deprecantibus **nobis.**" Lastly, the Missale Gothicum (p. 88, H.B.S.) has an interesting variation in an Easter *immolacio* (preface)—viz., ". . . ille (*i.e.*, Adam) **mortem temporalem** intulit, tu **vitam perpetuam** tribuisti." And again (p. 90): "nos a **morte perpetua** cum illo resuscitavit." And this phrase *mors perpetua* recurs in other Gallican books as a sort of transition, I think, to the later phraseology, when all references to the First Resurrection and Second Death are removed, probably in consequence of the spread of medieval views about Purgatory.

C. L. Feltoe.

III.—IN QUEST OF THE "APOSTOLIC ANAPHORA"

A Suggestion.

In the quest of the "Apostolic Anaphora," must we stop at the Eucharistic Prayer contained in the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus? It is at least permissible to endeavour to go farther back. The antiquity of the fundamental material in the liturgy of St. Adai and St. Mari is generally accepted. It can hardly be presumptuous, therefore, to postulate a residual early form of its Eucharistic Prayer by the elimination of obviously later additions. In a noteworthy article in the *Church Quarterly Review* for January, 1919, entitled "The Early Persian Liturgy" (pp. 315-328), the Rev. W. C. Bishop, by a comparison of the present form of the liturgy of St. Adai and St. Mari with the liturgical data contained in the Homilies of Narsai, has arrived at a very sure result as to the Persian Liturgy in the fourth and fifth centuries. And he is convinced that its more important prayers may be of even greater antiquity.

If, then, we compare, for example, this Eucharistic Prayer, in the form to which Mr. Bishop's study has already simplified it, with the parallel prayer from the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus (which last is now dated *c.* A.D. 230), a further reduction suggests itself. The *Sanctus* will go, and the phrases immediately surrounding it. This done, the prayer reads continuously. The Intercession also will go, and with it the doxology just preceding, as the introduction of the Intercession at this point made the portion of the thanksgiving ahead of it seem to hang in the air without a conclusion.

These excisions made, we have an act of joyous thanksgiving for creation and redemption that reads with remarkable continuity, flowing easily and naturally into the commemoration of Christ's death and resurrection, and the Invocation of the Holy Ghost and the concluding doxology. This note of exuberant thanksgiving binds it into a remarkable unity, and suggests the atmosphere of primitive times when appreciation of the "glad tidings of great joy" was keen, and the Eucharist regarded as indeed the "sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving."

This resultant Eucharistic Prayer is therefore appended as indicating a possible stage in development *prior* to that of the *Apostolic Tradition*. For the Narrative of Institution is absent, though an allusion to Christ's

command is found at the point where the Narrative is contained in other liturgies. Moreover, the Anamnesis contains no explicit offering of the elements such as occurs in the Eucharistic Prayer of the *Apostolic Tradition*. There is also an archaic simplicity about much of the phraseology of the prayer. Attention is called in the foot-notes to a few points of interest.

"Worthy of praise from every mouth and of thanksgiving from every tongue, and of adoration and exaltation from every creature is thy adorable and glorious name [O glorious Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost],* who didst create the world by thy grace, and its inhabitants by thy pitifulness, and didst save mankind by thy compassion, and hast showed great grace unto mortals. For thou hast shown great grace unto us which cannot be repaid, in that thou didst put on our manhood† that thou mightest quicken us by thy Godhead, and hast exalted our low estate and hast restored us from our fall, and hast raised our mortality, and hast forgiven our trespasses, and hast justified us from our guilt, and hast enlightened our knowledge, O our Lord and God, and hast condemned our enemies, and hast granted victory to the weakness of our frail nature in the overflowing mercies of thy grace. We also, O my Lord, thy weak and frail and miserable sinners, who are gathered together in thy name and stand before thee at this time, have received the example which is from thee and hath been delivered unto us,‡ rejoicing and praising and exalting and commemorating and celebrating§ before thee this great [and dread‖] and holy and life-giving and divine mystery of the passion and death and burial and resurrection of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. And may there come, O my Lord, thine holy Spirit and rest upon this oblation of thy servants [and bless and hallow it]¶ that it may be to us, O my Lord, for the pardon of offences and the forgiveness of sins, and for the great hope of resurrection from the dead, and for new life in the kingdom of heaven with all those who have been well-pleasing in thy sight. For all this great and marvellous dispensation towards us we give thee thanks, and glorify thee without ceasing in thy Church, redeemed by the precious blood of thy Christ, with unclosed mouths and open faces ascribing praise and glory and honour and thanksgiving and adoration to thy living and holy and life-giving name, now and ever and for ever and ever. *Amen.*"

* Probably the phrase between brackets displaced an earlier "O my Lord" or "O my Lord and God." A definite naming of the Trinity in prayer can hardly be considered early.

† The Incarnation is here spoken of as the act of the whole Godhead. This inexactness is surely characteristic of quite early times.

‡ We have here a distinct allusion to the Lord Christ's institution of the Eucharist and to His command for its observance. It is noteworthy that this allusion is made at the point where the complete narrative is introduced in other (and later?) rites.

§ We note here the absence of a definite oblation of the elements, such as is found, for example, in the *Apostolic Tradition* ("memores igitur mortis et resurrectionis ejus offerimus tibi panem et calicem").

‖ This word "dread" is probably a later addition; *cf.* Mr. Bishop's article already mentioned, p. 325, note 1.

¶ The specification ("to bless and hallow it") is not found in the *Apostolic Tradition*. Both liturgies, however, agree in asking, with reference to the Holy Spirit, for His action upon the oblation (*cf. Apostolic Tradition:* "Et petimus ut mittas spiritum tuum sanctum in oblationem sanctae ecclesiae").

H. R. GUMMEY.

REVIEWS

A Faith that Enquires. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the years 1920 and 1921. By Sir Henry Jones. Macmillan. 1922. Pp. x+361. 18s. net.

This book was published within a day or two of the author's death. It is his last message to the world, and it expresses all that was central and permanent in his teaching.

Henry Jones was a prophet among philosophers. In his youth he sat at the feet of Edward Caird; he imbibed the master's doctrine and followed him with unfailing loyalty and affection. In his own thinking there is perhaps nothing of striking novelty; but he had imagination and the gift of style; he saw how his thinking applied to life, the vision fired him, and he could make others see it also. Philosophers often feel the need of *not* letting themselves go, lest interest in the result should hamper the critical spirit. Thinking is a very intricate business and is very apt to err when self-criticism weakens. Hence the living interest in thought and its issues is repressed, and a book on philosophy may read like a dialectical exercise. Of this attitude there is no trace in the author's work. His writing is always full-blooded; even when the argument is abstract the seriousness of the problem and the emotions it provokes are apparent. It is a question of the meaning of life, and no attempt is made to view it with indifference.

There is another feature about the book which deserves mention. When it was writing, the author was under sentence of death, and he knew it. Ten years before he had emerged from a dangerous operation with shattered health. But he carried on his work with immense courage, exulting in the triumph of mind over bodily weakness. When the time came for his Gifford Lectures, the disease had reasserted itself; only a few of the lectures could be given in public; and all were composed in a time of struggle with physical pain. Of all this there is no hint in the book. Yet it is well to remember it as we read his discussion of the problem of suffering. The denial of the right of anyone to claim exemption from the common lot and the faith which finds the significance of suffering in its contribution to the evolution of the Best—these arguments acquire new impressiveness when we understand the experience from which they emerged.

It is hard to criticize such a book; but the author himself would have wished it to be taken on its merits. As was to be

expected, there are some things in it which might have been changed had opportunity been given for revision. For example, there are a number of references to the views expressed by the founder of the lectureships in his Will—surely one of the most remarkable wills ever recorded in the Scottish Court of Session. Lord Gifford is made by the author to speak of "the science of religion," and there is a reference to "what he called 'Natural Religion.'" Oddly enough, Lord Gifford never used the word "religion" at all in this connection. His term was always "Natural Theology." Again, the author's discussion of agnosticism, towards the beginning of the book, is made to hinge upon some words of Gifford's referring to the knowledge of God: "I think such knowledge, if real, lies at the root of all well-being." Commenting upon this, Jones speaks of "the ominous words—'*if real*,'" and says: "They suggest the possibility that all so-called religious knowledge may, in its very nature, be delusive. Its objects may be unreal." But this was not what Gifford meant. He would never have spoken of knowledge of God if there were no such being as God to be known. What he did mean is made quite clear in an earlier paragraph of the Will, in which he distinguishes "true and felt knowledge" from "mere nominal knowledge." To be effective knowledge must not be a mere intellectual assent to propositions; it must be realized in life. And so he goes on to say that he is "convinced that this knowledge [of God], when *really felt and acted on*, is the means of man's highest well-being, and the security of his upward progress."

But these are small matters. To anyone interested in the course of philosophical thought in England, one of the most significant things in the book is the definite cleavage it reveals between two parties in what may be called the English Hegelian School. Since 1893 outside observers have often wondered how long T. H. Green and Mr. Bradley would continue to be spoken of together as if they both taught very much the same view of reality. As we can now see, the situation was better gauged by the leaders of Idealism than by the rank and file. The *Life of Edward Caird*, issued last year, contains letters interchanged by Caird and Jones immediately after the publication of *Appearance and Reality*. They recognized that its arguments would have a disintegrating effect upon their own doctrines as well as upon those of naturalism. But Caird was averse from public controversy, and went on with his own work—though not unperturbed.

Green's argument about relations, whereby he had sought to confute the naturalists, was deftly turned by Mr. Bradley against the spiritual interpretation (indeed any interpretation)

of reality—much as Hume turned Berkeley's arguments against matter so as to destroy mind as well. This central point may not have had the prominence that it deserves in Caird's mind or in Jones's. But, in the present book, the author joins issue both with Mr. Bradley and with Mr. Bosanquet. He tells us that he has never learned the meaning of "appearance." And this after all Mr. Bradley's laborious dialectics! Yet it is not surprising. The antithesis of Reality and Appearance is one variant among many others—such as God and the world, the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, the one and the many, the eternal and the temporal, noumenon and phenomenon. It is the latest formula, but not necessarily the best. Its meaning takes colour from the others as occasion serves; but fundamentally and by derivation it comes from that subjective idealism according to which what a man knows is but his own mind turned inside out.

Perhaps the fundamental thought of the author's philosophy might be expressed by saying that all these antitheses are contrasts within a unity. "Every rational contrast," as he puts it, "falls within a unity of some kind"; and the nature of knowledge is always the discovery of the whole to which a fact belongs. Thus the opposed terms of the antitheses are not contradictory but complementary. If they were contradictory, then one aspect—the finite, the temporal, the many—would be false and unreal; and of the other aspect—the infinite, the eternal, the one—nothing would be predicable. But according to Jones both sides are real—the contrasting aspects of a unity. Thus man, the finite being, "has not to go beyond himself in order to reach the infinite. . . . He *is* the infinite in process." Similarly, from the other side, its reality lies in its expression in forms of finitude: "The 'eternal' is that which puts forth an endless series of successive 'nows';" and again: "The Absolute *is* the process, or the constant creative activity, which appears to us as the fixed order of the scheme of things."

A good deal might be said in criticism of this position and of the arguments by which it is supported, did the occasion call for such criticism. Perhaps too much play is made with abstract terms, while their precise meaning is not always kept clearly in view. To say that the eternal puts forth an endless series of successive "nows," or that man *is* the infinite in process, goes only a very little way towards solving the difficulties in the relation of the eternal to the temporal or of the infinite to the finite; but they are graphic statements of the significance of time and of human life.

Man "*is* the infinite in process"; "the Absolute *is* the process." The two—man and the Absolute—are thus brought

very close together; and, as the author would say, it is a living God that he has found. Here it is only possible to record, not to examine. But room should be found for a concluding sentence: "To me the idea of God as *the perfect in process*, as a movement from splendour to splendour in the spiritual world, as an eternal achievement and never-resting realization of the ideals of goodness in human history, is endlessly more attractive and, I believe, more consistent with our experience in the present world than the idea of a Divine Being who sits aloof from the world-process, eternally contemplating His own perfections."

With the title of the book is connected the appeal to the Churches to "treat the articles of the creeds not as dogmas but as the most probable explanation"; and in the Preface the author expresses the "hope that the Church will accept my service of its greater ends in the spirit in which it is offered."

W. R. Sorley.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY

PART I.—THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES

Vol. II., Prolegomena; II., Criticism.*

The publication of the second volume of the work planned on a large scale by Dr. Foakes Jackson and Dr. Kirsopp Lake makes it clear that we have to deal with a careful summary of the literary and historical criticism of the last generation rather than with an attempt to open up any new method of approach to the study of the beginnings of Christianity. The volume at present under discussion is divided into three parts, to which are added three appendices.

PART I.

The Composition and Purpose of Acts.

1. The Greek and Jewish Traditions of Writing History. Henry J. Cadbury and the Editors.
2. The Use of the Greek Language in Acts. J. de Zwaan.
3. The Use of the Septuagint in Acts. W. R. L. Clarke.
4. The Use of Mark in the Gospel according to Luke. F. C. Burkitt.
5. The Internal Evidence of Acts. The Editors.

* Edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D., and Kirsopp Lake, D.D. Published by Macmillan and Co., 1922. The price of the volume is 24s. Vol. I. dealt with general prolegomena to the Acts, and Vols. III. and IV. will consist of a commentary on the Acts.

PART II.

THE IDENTITY OF THE EDITOR OF LUKE AND ACTS.

1. The Tradition. Henry J. Cadbury.
2. The Case for the Tradition. C. W. Emmet.
3. The Case against the Tradition. H. Windisch.
4. Subsidiary Points (the use of medical language in the "Lucan Writings," Luke and Josephus). H. J. Cadbury and the Editors.

PART III.

THE HISTORY OF CRITICISM.

1. The Historical Criticism of Acts in Germany. A. C. McGiffert.
2. British Work on the Acts. J. W. Hunkin.

Appendix A : Two Literary Analogies—

1. The Story of St. Francis of Assisi. A. A. Coulton.
2. The Story of Margaret Catchpole. The Editors.

Appendix B : Vestigia Christi (a précis of the march of events, according to Luke, from the Baptism by John to the arrival in Jerusalem). F. C. Burkitt.

Appendix C : Commentary on the Preface of Luke. H. J. Cadbury.

The Editors have complained that the English reviewers of the first volume have contented themselves with general criticism, and have not contributed any detailed criticism which enabled the Editors to reconsider their conclusions on any particular point, and they have been inclined to attribute the unfavourable reviews to English conservatism. But the appearance of the second volume makes it clear that the real question at issue is not any point of detail, but the general method of approach to the documents which form the New Testament, and therefore to the scientific study of the beginnings of Christianity.

At the moment when English theology is preparing to make its long-delayed contribution to the study of Christian origins, these volumes represent an attempt to drag it back into posing the problem in terms of literature, rather than in terms of a developing religion. The Editors think in terms of literary documents, and seem unable to think in any other terms. This is natural, for Dr. Kirsopp Lake was trained in the school of textual criticism, and grew to maturity in the atmosphere of the University of Leiden, where the study of theology is dominated by the German method of approach. Notoriously the German theologians think in terms of documents. Dr. Foakes Jackson's contribution is that of a man who has a mastery of the art of writing English. Dr. Lake and other scholars present him with the results of their analysis of the New Testament documents, and Dr. Foakes Jackson puts these results into

literary form, and the result is the scheme of the book we have before us.

But this is not all. The Editors apparently think that the Acts of the Apostles is the result of a like collaboration. Luke, the literary historian, is working upon crude Christian documents, the rough work of the primitive Christians, and he shapes them into a literary history, of which the Acts is the second volume. The energy of scholarship is, therefore, directed towards the discovery of the sources which Luke used, these sources being always assumed to be literary. Thus, in the second appendix the Editors argue that the novel, in which the story of Margaret Catchpole was told by a Suffolk clergyman, Mr. Cobbold, is a literary parallel to the Acts.

But this almost feverish search for literary sources is conditioned by a further motive. It is assumed that these sources, could they be discovered, would reveal a simple Christology, which has been submerged by Luke's literary and "Catholicizing" skill; for this reason the Editors have included in their book Dr. Coulton's study of the development of the Franciscan literature, in which the figure of St. Francis was gradually blurred by the direct or indirect influence of the medieval Papacy. Now, we cannot doubt that early Christian literature does represent a development, and, could the primitive Christology be reconstructed, some people would be surprised and even shocked; but it is not at all certain that it is Dr. Coulton, and those who, like him, believe in Jesus as the simple Jewish prophet, who would be able to say: "I told you so." The Franciscan literature would be more likely to provide a parallel to early Christian literature had Christianity been recaptured by the Jewish authorities at Jerusalem, and become a movement within Judaism rather than a new religion. There would seem to be no parallel in the Franciscan movement to the vivid belief of the early Christians in the guiding power of the risen and ascended Lord; yet it is this which primarily conditioned the development in the Christian writings, rather than the controlling power of an authority which was in any sense parallel to the medieval hierarchy.

This belief in a primitive simple Christology, existing in the documents which Luke used, has led the Editors to what would seem to be a clear case of false exegesis. Commenting on the conclusion of St. Paul's speech at Athens, in which Jesus is proclaimed as a man "whom God appointed to judge the world in righteousness," they say: "It is noticeable that this is an example of an unmixed 'Son of Man' Christology. It seems to us to belong to a less developed form of thought than that of the editor of Acts. This is one of the minor

reasons in favour of the view that there is a documentary source behind the second part of Acts."* But parallel phrases are used in the earlier speeches in the Acts, and the origin of them would seem to be an elaborate comparison between Jesus and David. The key to this language is found in St. Paul's speech at Antioch. David, the *man after God's own heart,* who was to do all His will, was persecuted by Saul; but Saul was destroyed, and God *raised* David to be King over the people of God. So Jesus, David's Lord, the Son of God, was persecuted by the Jewish authorities and crucified; but God *raised* Him from the dead, and appointed Him to rule and judge in righteousness the true people of God—that is, the Christians. This is no simple, unmixed " Son of Man " Christology; it is an elaborate David Christology, carefully worked out; and the phrases which at first sight seem to support an adoptionist Christology, are in point of fact Christian glosses on the description of David as " the man after God's own heart."

But I do not wish to be drawn into a criticism of details. It is far more important to criticize the method of approach. The truth would seem to be that the Editors fail to interpret the Acts, because they are so obsessed with Luke as an author, and with the search for the documents he made use of, that they have failed to notice that he was a Christian, the product of a new religion, which was converting men and women from paganism and from Judaism—a religion so powerful that the Christians could not but proclaim Christianity as the true religion, on the acceptance of which the salvation of men depended. This was the background of the Lucan writings, and gave Luke the impulse to authorship. He wished to show that the Gospel which was effective in his day was the same Gospel which the first Apostles preached with such marked result, and which the Lord Himself had originally proclaimed.

If this be so, then a commentary on the Lucan writings should form a contribution to the study of the " embryology of religious phenomena," and in such a study the actual psychology of authorship would form but a small part of a much larger subject. In the present work the question of literary authorship has dominated the whole.

No doubt Luke did use literary sources, and therefore Dr. Kirsopp Lake has real qualifications as an editor; no doubt Luke was a literary historian, and therefore Dr. Foakes Jackson has a real contribution to make to the interpretation of Acts. But they need as a third editor someone who has experience of some portion of the mission field, in which Christianity is beginning to catch the imagination of the crowds and to effect

* Page 189 and note.

conversions. The following story would seem to throw more light on the background of Acts than the whole volume which we are discussing:

There was living two years ago in the Chih-li province of North China, near the town Ho-chien, a woman who, though thirty-five years old, had never heard of Christianity. She had been ill for a long time, and, in spite of having sold her property and spent her money on Chinese doctors, she grew steadily worse and worse, till her case was regarded as hopeless. One night she dreamed that an old white-haired man came to her, and said: "Drink two bottles of foreign medicine." In the morning her uncle came to see her; she told him the dream, and asked him to go at once to the foreign hospital some miles away. He went, found the hospital, and brought a doctor. The doctor told the woman that if she came to the hospital, he would heal her in twenty days. She refused to go. The doctor, however, came four or five times to see her, but finally refused to continue his visits, being unable to afford the time. The woman then consented to be taken to the hospital. On the twentieth day she returned home healed. On her return she again dreamed a dream; the white-haired man again appeared to her, and said: "You and your daughter must turn round." During the time she had been in the hospital she had been present at a Christian service, so she interpreted the old man's words as meaning that she must become a Christian. She was baptized and confirmed, and is now not only physically well, but a convinced and converted Christian. On being asked how she lives so happily, she says: "Oh, the good God protects me." When the Chinese Christian Bible-women visited the town where these events had taken place, they were surrounded by crowds thronging the streets outside the house where they lived, saying: "We have heard about the good God; tell us about Him." And they preached the Gospel, and many conversions followed.*

It would seem that if English theology is to make any independent contribution to the solution of the problems which surround the "beginnings of Christianity," it will be by a careful analysis of Christian religious experience, and especially of missionary experience, rather than by a strict adherence to the traditional methods of literary and historical criticism. The present volume contains no word of criticism of the critics, and is therefore a valuable summary of the findings of literary criticism, but not more.

We cannot, however, afford to disregard the work done during the nineteenth century; and for this reason the book is

* Communicated by Deaconess Edwards of North China.

important, for material has been collected by the Editors and made available for English readers which would otherwise be difficult to find. It is particularly interesting to have an article by Professor Windisch of Leiden, though one could have wished it had been the Windisch of the *Taufe und Sünde im ältesten Christentum*, or of the commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews in the *Hand-Kommentar*, in both of which books he deals with the religion of the first Christians, rather than with the literary form in which their experience was expressed. Also, the contributions made by Dr. Cadbury are the work of a real scholar, and his commentary on the " Preface of Luke " in Appendix C is a model of what such a commentary should be.

Mr. Clarke's article on the " Use of the Septuagint in Acts " seems to the present writer the most valuable article in the book, because, if Acts be popular Christianity expressed in literary form, this article shows how fundamentally primitive Christian language was moulded by the Septuagint.

Those who hold the theory that primitive Christianity was largely influenced by the mystery religions have to deal with the fact that the Lucan writings show no clear traces of such influence. Words and phrases which might be due to such influence are, in point of fact, Septuagint words and phrases. It is good, also, that Mr. Clarke has refused to allow the works of the late Dr. Selwyn to fall into oblivion.* Strangely enough, Mr. Hunkin, in his essay on " British Work on the Acts," has not even referred to them.

Professor Burkitt writes on the " Use of Mark in the Gospel according to Luke." He must be a thorn in the side of the Editors; for he comes to the conclusion that, since we do not possess the sources which Luke used in writing Acts, it is impossible to discover them by any process of literary analysis.

In conclusion, attention may be called to one or two points of detail. The evidence of the use of Acts in the *Epistola Apostolorum* may have some bearing on the provenance of the Lucan writings. This recently discovered document needs some further treatment from this point of view. The Editors still apparently take seriously the suggestion that in the source which Luke used, the John who accompanied Peter was John Mark, and Luke has turned him into the Apostle.† Is there one single shred of evidence for this ? If the Apostle John is introduced here, may it not be that Luke was writing among Christians, for whom St. John was the great Apostle; and for this reason Luke emphasizes his association with St. Peter at the beginning ?

The Editors have called attention to the close similarity

* Referred to on page 68. † Page 146.

existing between the theology of the Lucan writings and that summarized in the Apostles' Creed.* "The most striking similarity with Acts is not offered by any book in the New Testament, but rather by the Apostles' Creed." They then draw a sharp distinction between this "type of Christianity" and that which is "represented by the later Epistles of St. Paul, by the Fourth Gospel, and by the Alexandrian School, and found final expression in the Nicene Creed." They give the impression that they think that there existed at the end of the first century a Church which was "especially Lucan." "Find this Church, and you have reason to say that the development of the Creed is likely to have taken place there; or identify the place where the Creed developed, and you have a right to say that Luke and Acts are likely to have been cherished by the Church in that place."

This means that the Apostles' Creed was not a summary of Christian doctrine which had its origin in Christian literature and tradition as a whole, but was drawn up in some particular Church under the influence of the Lucan writings. The Editors cannot find that Church. The truth would seem to be that a specifically Lucan Church is a myth, because all the local Christian Churches were Lucan; one might, however, just as well say Marcan or Matthean. These documents, in fact, represent popular Christianity, and the more personal writings of the New Testament are the result of some form of reflection upon this tradition. The Fourth Gospel presumes it, and so does the Epistle to the Hebrews, and so do the Pauline letters. It would seem, therefore, impossible to draw any clear-cut line between the so-called Synoptic tradition and the Pauline and Johannine theology, because the latter sprang out of the former. The search for a Lucan Church would therefore seem to be a fruitless search.

E. C. Hoskyns.

* Pages 199–204.

NOTICES

OLD VILLAGE LIFE: OR, GLIMPSES OF VILLAGE LIFE THROUGH ALL AGES. By P. H. Ditchfield, M.A., F.S.A., F.R.S.L., F.R.Hist.S., Oriel College, Oxford; Rector of Barkham, Berkshire. With 40 Illustrations and Plans. Cr. 8vo. Pp. xii+253. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1920. 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. Ditchfield's list of contributions to the literature of English country life is a long one. He has written much, always interestingly, often with illumination, on many aspects of life in our rural parishes, and in his time he must have given a great deal of pleasure to a large number of readers. His present work is worthy to rank, as a highly agreeable volume, with any of its numerous predecessors. But it is a pity, considering how agreeable it is as a piece of reading, that Mr. Ditchfield has not added to its value by avoidance of certain very palpable errors—some of fact, some of faulty opinion. In certain matters Mr. Ditchfield appears to be careless about carelessness. He will not even give us the correct title of *Piers Ploughman*. He seems to think that the far-famed Cotswold Games were held in the sixteenth century, and he says they were celebrated at Barton-on-the-Heath—a turning-up of the *Annalia Dubrensia*, or of Graves's *Spiritual Quixote*, to say nothing of a reference in documented editions of such works as Brand, would have told him that Captain Dover's annual festivals were held at Dover's Hill, near Chipping Campden. These are matters of fact; some of Mr. Ditchfield's opinions require the support of substantiation; it would be difficult for him to prove, for example, that the architecture of Westminster Abbey was the concept, development, and perfected work of our own people. Nor will mere assertion of his great qualities whitewash the Stuart squire; contemporary documents, and the numerous diaries and letters of the period, easily accessible in the reprints of the Surtees and similar societies, make us much more inclined to hold with Macaulay that the seventeenth-century country gentleman got his chief pleasures from field sports and an unrefined sensuality, than with Mr. Ditchfield that he was public-spirited, courteous, and intellectual. The fact is that when Mr. Ditchfield gets to pure history he becomes prejudiced, inexact, and unreliable. His prejudices lead him to the use of immoderate language; he confuses biassed assertion with plain proof, as in his treatment of the events immediately following the Norman Conquest. Sometimes he contradicts himself—on page 143 he says that the Peasants' Revolt of 1381 proved itself a hopeless failure and accomplished nothing; on page 144 he says that it really accomplished much. Worst of all Mr. Ditchfield's unsupported opinions—which are set forth as if they were *ex cathedra* utterances—are those about the Reformation and the state of the Church in the centuries immediately preceding that momentous event, and one can only hope that some of his readers, at any rate, will turn from him to Gairdner, and to Whitney, and to the second volume of the Cambridge Modern History. To tell the ordinarily fairly educated reader of these days that the Reformation in England arose out of the lust and greed of Henry VIII. and the Machiavellian policy of Thomas Cromwell, and to ignore the reform movement which had been stirring for three centuries, is as ridiculous as it is to hold up the later medieval Church to us as a pattern of perfection.

But, mistakes or no mistakes, Mr. Ditchfield will find many readers—there always are readers of this sort of book, folk who are not very particular about points of history or archæology, but who love to be entertained with pleasant, chatty gossip about an England which is vanishing before our very eyes. And Mr. Ditchfield, apart from his bias, is a good companion, and all the better because in addition to liberal draughts on his own balances he knows how to borrow from the stores of others. He is a master of well-chosen extract; he knows, too, how to add to the charm of his book in the matter of illustrating its text. In plain fact, he is an accomplished book-maker, and it would be well if the managers of all our village libraries would see to it that their shelves contain such books as this, many others by the same hand, some similar volumes by Mr. Baring Gould—any works, in short, written in plain English, which would help the villager to learn something about village history and its meanings and values. There may come a day when, in that collection of books which ought to be found just within the porch of every parish church, not one village in England will be without at any rate an abstract, even in mere pamphlet form, of the story of its own fortunes. As things are, few villagers know anything of the history of the parish to which they belong—there are, indeed, comparatively few incumbents who can tell anything of the past of the place in which they have a present interest. One cannot help wishing that the clergy who are so deeply concerned about the value of tithe and the rights of the parson's freehold would give some little attention to the riches which lie hidden in parish registers and in damp-spoiled papers, too often lying neglected in muniment chests. How people—and especially young people—can possibly be expected to take an interest in the affairs of a parish when all its past, always interesting, often full of historical importance, is a sealed book to them, is a question which a very considerable number of our country clergy steadfastly ignore. Yet what a field!—one for which the country parson, with his many hours of leisure, is eminently fitted. Does it never strike those village clergy who complain that their folk will not go to church that they might go much more readily if they knew what a glorious heritage they have, not only in the faith that has come down to them through long ages, but in the mere fabric of the church wherein it has been preached age after age? Let a man get it firmly into his mind that his faith and his church are priceless possessions, and that he should be proud of sharing them with his forefathers, and he will value both more than he does at present in too many instances. Books like this of Mr. Ditchfield's are a great help in this direction. If there are things in it to which historian and archæologist may rightly take exception, there is also far more which each must welcome gladly as helpful in making the villager curious to learn still further of his parish and its past.

J. S. Fletcher.

The French Revolution. By G. P. Gooch. Cr. 8vo. Pp. 47. (Helps for Students of History, No. 29.) London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1920. 8d. net.

Mr. Gooch's little handbook is the latest addition to one of the most admirable series of historical primers ever put at the disposal of students. Like its predecessors, it is both concise and full, brief yet packed with knowledge. As an indication of sources it leaves nothing to be desired, and whoever reads one-half of the literature to which it serves as guide-

post will find himself extremely well acquainted with the causes and effects of what the Preface rightly calls "the most important event in the life of modern Europe," compared by Hender to the Reformation and the rise of Christianity. "It deserves to be ranked with those two great movements in history," continues the Preface, "because, with them, it destroyed the landmarks of the world in which generations of men had passed their lives, because it was a movement towards a completer humanity, and because it too was a religion, with its doctrines, its apostles, and its martyrs. . . . As Christianity taught that man was a spiritual being, and the Reformation proclaimed that no barrier should stand between the soul and God, so the Revolution asserted the equality of men, and declared each one of them, regardless of birth, colour, or religion, to be possessed of inalienable rights." And so much are we of this period, and especially at the present troublous time, still influenced by the doings of the days wherein "France performed the work of the human race at the price of her own blood," that it is almost a positive duty of all thinking men to acquaint themselves fully with the true history of the Revolution in order to get at its values in human history. Such will not find anywhere a better guide than Mr. Gooch in the all-important matter of what to read on this great subject.

J. S. Fletcher.

Christian Monasticism in Egypt to the Close of the Fourth Century. By the Rev. W. H. Mackean. S.P.C.K., London. 1920. Pp. 160. 8s. net.

St. Bernard of Clairvaux's Life of St. Malachy of Armagh. By H. J. Lawlor, D.D., Litt.D. S.P.C.K., London. 1920. Pp. lxvi + 183. Price 12s. net.

We have here two notable examples of the scholarly activity of the S.P.C.K. Mr. Mackean's monograph forms one of the Society's series of Studies in Church History, Dr. Lawlor's being a volume in Series V., which is devoted to the lives of the Celtic saints. Both are works which will take their place in the permanent literature of their subjects, though the latter opens up a less-trodden tract for the general student. Both are occupied with monasticism, the one summarizing in a convenient form the mass of knowledge which is now available of the origin and early history of the monks and eremites of Egypt, the latter telling the story, in the main clear but built on some acute guesses, how the long-delayed transformation of the abnormal monastic system of the Irish Church into normal Western diocesan form was contributed to by a great ascetic personality in the period of change, the twelfth century.

The root-problem of Mr. Mackean's inquiry is, of course, "Whence and why did monasticism arise in the fourth century?" He clears the ground by rejecting Hilgenfeld's theory that it was borrowed from Buddhism, Weingarten's that it was a development of something pagan and Egyptian, and other suppositions which derive it directly from Greek or Jewish sources. Except in so far as such influences formed the atmosphere in which nascent Christianity developed, and generally contributed to the formation of a mystical and ascetic type of mind, we agree with Mr. Mackean that they are insufficient causes for so vast a phenomenon.

Students are fairly well agreed about the conditions that made Egyptian Christianity energize in the way it did, and Mr. Mackean

details them with balance and judgment, leaving none out: the asceticism in the air of Alexandria in the third century, Eastern, Hellenistic, pagan, Christian, Origenic, the Neo-Platonic mysticism, the need of an outlet for lay devotion, the secularization of the Church in the fourth century and the cessation of persecution, the lawless condition of Egypt and the pressing burden of taxation, admirably illustrated from the papyri, and the call of the wild with its vast distances and temperate climate. "This may be said to form the fuel of the monastic movement. The match was supplied by the example and influence of the great St. Anthony." The development of monasticism in its eremitic, collective, and cœnobitic forms is well given, and the important matter of its connection with official Christianity and the influence of Athanasius sufficiently dealt with. The writer, of course, acknowledges his indebtedness to Dom C. Butler, P. Ladeuze, and H. B. Workman, and uses Cassian liberally, but does not refer to Dr. Wallis Budge.

Dr. Lawlor's Introduction is a very scholarly piece of work, and gives a thorough account of how the Irish Church in the course of the eleventh century abolished its early Celtic features, unparalleled elsewhere in Christendom, and became by 1200 a faithful daughter of Rome. "In default of a better word we may call the movement a Reformation, though it might perhaps be more accurately described as an ecclesiastical revolution." The central point of the movement was the substitution of a diocesan organization under the Pope for the loose system of monastic foundation under lay-abbots or "coarbs," who had become hereditary. Combined with the entire subordination of the bishops to the abbots was a low state of morality, a disregard of the rites of Confession, Confirmation, and Matrimony, and the lack of a system of tithe-paying. St. Bernard's Life is one authority for the low state of the Irish Church, and we must with Dr. Lawlor not be prepared to acquit him altogether of exaggeration.

St. Malachy was the leading spirit in the second generation of Reformers. Dr. Lawlor gives an admirable picture of his predecessors, Gilbert of Limerick, whom he succeeded as Papal Legate; Cellach, whom be followed at Armagh; O'Dunan of Meath, and the O'Briens of Munster. He took up their views and built on the foundation they had laid; his saintly personality, the miraculous powers ascribed to him, his unfaltering purpose and spirit of asceticism, made the triumph of Roman Christianity quite assured when he died at Clairvaux in 1148.

The Life, which from internal evidence was penned by St. Bernard only three months after Malachy's death, when the pathos of it was still fresh in his mind, is a document that not only records what Malachy had done in Ireland, but reveals to no small extent the charm of its great writer's mind, and the whole attitude of the religious men of his day. The account of the miracles of Malachy, being contemporary and uncoloured, gives useful data for the study of these phenomena from a psychological standpoint. There is little in them that, given an extraordinary personality and the expectation of abnormal events, cannot be normally explained.

To the Life are appended two letters of St. Bernard to St. Malachy, and two sermons that he preached—one immediately after his death, and one on its anniversary. The careful and full notes are in themselves evidence of the translator's exhaustive knowledge of this period of Irish Church History.

W. J. Ferrar.

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